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I. INTRODUCTION
Constructed as a basic legal proposition, the right of humanitarian
intervention-that is, the transnational application of force by states
under the banner of humanitarian concern-challenges the fundamental
doctrine upon which the contemporary system of international law oper-
ates: the doctrine of state sovereignty and the concomitant principle of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.' In a world which has
* On sabbatical leave from the University of Nottingham School of Law as Visiting
Fellow of the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School. Presented to the International
Law Section of the Annual Meeting of the Society of Public Teachers of Law (S.P.T.L.) at the
University of Warwick on September 20, 1997. I am indebted to Catherine J. Redgwell,
Colin Warbrick, Vaughan Lowe and Dominic McGoldrick for their insightful and thoughtful
comments in response to an earlier draft of this article.
1. For the purposes of this article, the legal definition of humanitarian intervention which
is adopted is that provided by Professor Wil D. Verwey to the effect that humanitarian interven-
tion is "the protection by a state or group of states of fundamental human rights, in particular the
right to life, of nationals of, and residing in, the territory of other states, involving the use or
threat of force, such protection taking place neither upon the authorization by the relevant or-
gans of the [United Nations] nor upon invitation by the legitimate government of the target
state." Wil D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF
THE USE OF FORCE 57, 59 (A. Cassese ed., 1986). Compare SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 11-12 (1996) (stating
that humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or interna-
tional organization in order to protect the target state's nationals from deprivation of
internationally recognized human rights) and W. Michael Reisman, Hollow Victory: Humani-
tarian Intervention and Protection of Minorities, 91 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 431 (1997)
(supporting a wider definitional scope for humanitarian intervention so that the term now "also
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come to cherish the philosophical constructs of sovereignty and state-
hood as the legal identity of each of its politico-territorial communities,
it comes as no surprise that "intervention" in the affairs of any of these
communities has been depicted as a necessary evil forbidden by law.2
Even when an intervention is recognized as permissible in principle-
where, for example, a government in undisputed control of its territory
has requested or given its consent to it-international law still brands
the action as an intervention of sorts, albeit an intervention by consent.
Furthermore, in cases of profound moral or humanitarian alarm, strict
adherence to the principle of non-intervention in some circles continues
to prioritize it above the compelling imperatives and considerations
which appear to have provoked or precipitated these interventions in
actual practice.'
refers to interventions for humanitarian purposes by international organizations. Such organiza-
tional actions are significant, from a legal standpoint, only if the humanitarian impulse is the
sole authoritative basis for the action in question"). The preferred approach is to regard inter-
ventions authorized by the Security Council for humanitarian purposes as casusfoedris which,
as such, properly fall for consideration as precedents under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter because that is where their legal basis is located. See J.P. Humphrey, Foreword to
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS at vii, viii (Richard B. Lillich ed.,
1973); see also infra note 26. Although this article does draw upon the experiences of inter-
ventions which have received the sanction of the United Nations, it does so to illustrate the
arguments it makes, without compromising the legal definition endorsed herein.
Finally, it should be noted that where states use force to protect their own nationals, this
utilization is to be seen either as an element of the right of self-defense or as a separate con-
ceptual head for intervention altogether. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States
to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 332 (1967); Michael Akehurst, Humanitar-
ian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 95, 99 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984).
There is, however, an undoubted "overlap" in "functional terms" with humanitarian inter-
vention. Ian Brownlie, Non-Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in THE NON-
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17, 25 (William E. Butler ed., 1989).
2. MARTri KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 203-04 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he very term 'intervention'
suggests the idea of wrongfulness of the act-sometimes, as in 1960 when the U.N. Security
Council condemned the capture of Adolf Eichmann by Israeli security forces in Argentinean
territory, even against prima facie strong moral reasons for approval"). In its resolution on the
matter, the Security Council reaffirmed the principle of Argentina's territorial integrity and
called upon Israel to "make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the rules of international law." U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp., Apr.-June 1960, at
35, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). The existence of a legal mechanism for the expatriation of fugi-
tives (such as an extradition treaty), absent in Eichmann's case, has caused a recent flurry of
attention in the United States where the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit were overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States in both United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 505 U.S. 1201
(1992).
3. Although, it is important to note that in the Eichmann episode, on which, see supra
note 2, where there was never any doubt of a violation of the international legal principle of
non-intervention, "Argentina and other nations were, as anticipated, reluctant to appear to
champion Eichmann or to interfere with his trial, even in order to vindicate the universally ac-
cepted principle of territorial integrity," and that "the debates [in the Security Council] revealed
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This article's purpose is not to search for particular conclusions as
to the substantive merit or the present legal status of the right of hu-
manitarian intervention as defined and in view of this seeming tension
between recent practice and established principle. Its governing con-
cern, rather, lies with: fundamental principles of analysis and method;
the formal sources of public international law consulted in the examina-
tion of the validity of humanitarian intervention; how normative
determinations are reached in the first place; and the techniques which
are adopted in navigating our course to these ends."
To make its case, the article identifies three objections that have ap-
peared in the legal literature and that have been used against the
endorsement of the right of humanitarian intervention in international
law: the prospect of the abuse of the right of humanitarian intervention,
the propensity for its selective application, and finally, the nature of the
motives of states who intervene in its name. These objections are of a
policy, rather than of an empirical, orientation and yet, somehow, have
come to eclipse more appropriate methods for deciding where humani-
tarian intervention. stands as a matter of law. The article proceeds to
emphasize the importance of a return to empirical-based methods of
international law-determination at a time of prodigious-and relevant-
state practice, but it is also used as an essential platform for questioning
the cogency of these objections in view of the experiences and conduct
of the interventions that have taken place since the end of the Cold War.
Offering its critique of these common policy objections, the article
presents the argument that old and worn controversies as to the place of
humanitarian intervention within the normative framework of the jus ad
bellum still remain, notwithstanding the revival and re-working of
international institutions and decision-making fora. These controversies
persist because some states continue to apply armed force for
humanitarian purposes without the formal authorization of these
institutions, and yet have done so without their condemnation or
censure-interventions which have also been greeted by the apparent
approval and guarded applause of states. This possible acceptance of
some understanding, if not sympathy, for Israel's position." Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 275-76 (2d ed. 1979).
4. For the configurations of constructing normative propositions in classic interna-
tional law, see Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 1971
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 79, 80 (identifying: (1) the "autological" or deductive form which fash-
ions legal argument on the basis of deduction, analysis or tautology and which emanates
from "an underlying rule of internal logical consistency in international law"; (2) the empiri-
cal form, which relies on "the practice of states, the situation of fact, the history of the
matter" and (3) the teleological or policy form, which argues for "rules determined on the
basis of utilitarian reasoning or defined social and policy objectives").
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such interventions has meant that we are still faced with real questions
in need of real answers that cannot-and indeed should not-be
postponed by ease of reference to policy objections which are
themselves of doubtful validity and which could in fact constitute a
denial of any genuine changes that may have taken place in the
normative convictions of states.
In examining this practice, the article argues, we shall be able to as-
certain whether states are permitted in law to exercise their so-called
(individual or collective) right of humanitarian intervention, and this
will, in turn, illuminate our understanding of the scope and nature of the
principle of non-intervention in modem international law. Casting its
final reflections on the possible place of humanitarian intervention in a
world of multiple sovereigns, the article considers as its overarching
theme the law-determination mechanisms within the United Nations and
suggests that the international law scholar carries a significant share of
the burden in venturing an account of the legal status of humanitarian
intervention at any given moment in time, history or practice.
II. OF THE HISTORY, NATURE, AND SCOPE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
That the principle of non-intervention commands such high promi-
nence in international law cannot be doubted. The principle's positivist
credentials derive from a vast multitude of legal texts and a monotonous
succession of declarations and proclamations where it has been given
repeated (if not rhetorical) mention. Its conventional existence is owed
principally to a range of global and regional treaties,5 and its customary
law status is verified in part by an on-going cavalcade of United Nations
resolutions.6 The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and
5. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil
Strife, Feb. 20, 1928, art. 1, 134 L.N.T.S. 25, 51; Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties
of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 8, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25; Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22,
1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237, 254; Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30,
1948, art. 18, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 58; Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963,
art. 4, 2 I.L.M. 766, 768; Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,
Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190.
6. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1965) (adopted by 109 votes to zero with an abstention cast by the United Kingdom);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (adopted by consen-
sus); Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in
1008 [Vol. 19:1005
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generations of international legal scholarship have confirmed the princi-
ple's cardinal legal ranking.7 States jealously treasure the principle of
non-intervention, and it is the chief envy of aspiring states because it is
the legal insurance of their sovereign existence. In principle, therefore,
the principle of non-intervention as it has been defined in international
law reigns supreme.
When referring to the actual legal materials which preach and pro-
mote the principle of non-intervention in international affairs, we notice
the absolute form that has been fastened upon its very being. General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), for example, provides that "[n]o
state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
state."9 Armed intervention is singled out for particular mention as a
"violation of international law,"'0 but the principle of non-intervention as
the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/301, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art 1,
U.N. Doc. A/36/761 (1982) (adopted by 120 votes to twenty-two with six abstentions); Decla-
ration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or
Use of Force, G.A. Res. 42/22, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 41, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/41
(1987).
7. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); Military and Para-
military Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case];
AuGusTus GRANVILLE STAPELTON, INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION OR THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1790 TO 1865 (1866); ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921); J.E.S. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, II RECUEIL DES
CouRs (Academe De Droit International) 342 (1961); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (5th ed. 1998); Dominic McGoldrick, The Principle of Non-
Intervention. Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTER.
NATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MICHAEL AKEHURST 85, 87-94 (Vaughan Lowe &
Colin Warbrick eds., 1994).
8. It is important to note the emphasis which the International Court of Justice placed
upon the coercive nature of intervention as it understood the term in the Nicaragua Case,
1986 I.C.J. 205, at 108: "[tlhe element of coercion which defines and indeed forms the
very essence of prohibited intervention is particularly obvious in the case of intervention
which uses force." See also Thomas Oppermann, Intervention, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1436 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995). Antonio Cassese describes the princi-
ple of non-intervention as "a solid and indispensable 'bridge' between the traditional,
sovereignty-orientated structure of the international community and the 'new' attitude of States
based on coexistence geared to more intense social intercourse, and closer co-operation."
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 144 (1986). States therefore
find themselves in a situation in which the principle of non-intervention "plays the role of a
necessary shield behind which states can shelter in the knowledge that their more intense inter-
national relations will not affect their most vital and delicate domestic interests." Id.
9. G.A. Res 2625, supra note 6, at 123; see ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LtMrrS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 87 (1986).
10. This coincides with the cardinal prohibition on the use of force contained in Article
2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, which obliges states to "refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" G.A.
1009Summer 1998]
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constructed also outlaws "the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind."' No scope for exceptional cases or conflicting
considerations is entertained in the resolution. The kernel of the princi-
ple of non-intervention as defined thus embodies the essence of the first
formulation of the principle by the General Assembly in Resolution
2131 (XX) of 1965. This was reiterated in Resolution 36/103 of 1981,
despite the burgeoning catalogue of interventions which have occurred
and continue to occur for various reasons in United Nations practice.
The deepening chasm which separates practice from principle has drawn
the normative scope of the principle into question, notwithstanding the
relentless insistence on its continued status in international law by the
General Assembly. 2
The International Court of Justice has followed a less didactic line
in its jurisprudence on the nature and scope of the principle of non-
intervention in international law. This approach is best exemplified by
the Court in the Nicaragua Case in 1986. Charged with the responsibil-
ity of deciding the disputes which are brought before it in accordance
with international law, the Court was, and remains, mindful of the for-
mal sources of law which it must consult in the execution of this task."
The Court reflected this approach in an important dictum of its ruling-
a section of the judgment that appears to have been lost in the mire of
recitations of the principle of non-intervention. After reviewing the pro-
lific legal practice which has secured for the principle of non-
intervention its pride of place in customary international law, the Court
indicated that any "[r]eliance by a state on a novel right or an unprece-
dented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other
states, tend toward a modification of customary international law.""14 For
this to occur, it was incumbent on the Court to determine "whether there
Res. 2625, supra note 6, at 123 (emphasis added). This principle is also firmly established in
customary international law. See Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 188, at 99; ARNOLD MCNAIR,
THE LAW OF TREATIES 206-11, 215-18 (1961).
11. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 6, at 123.
12. For an eloquent exposition of this claim, see Vaughan Lowe, The Principle of Non-
Intervention: Use of Force, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MICHAEL AKEHURST 66 (Vaughan Lowe & Colin Warbrick
eds., 1994). The legal prohibition on reprisals has suffered an identical criticism in that "this
norm has acquired its own 'credibility gap' by reason of the divergence between the norm
and the actual practice of states." D.W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed
Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972); see also Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the Interna-
tional Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415 (1969).
13. Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, appended to the
1945 United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. STATUTE].
14. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 207, at 109 (emphasis added).
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might be indications of a practice illustrative of belief in a kind of gen-
eral right for states to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without
armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another state, whose
cause appeared particularly worthy by reason of the political and moral
values with which it was identified."
15
With these words the Court demonstrated that it was prepared-at
least in principle-to approach state practice on the non-intervention
issue with a more open mind and with greater investigative rigor than
the General Assembly, which could be said to have shown a general im-
potence to "cope with anything more than the shortest of intellectual
agendas and the simplest of principles. 16 The Court, of course, labors
under a more exacting obligation than does the General Assembly in
that it is required to take heed of "general practice accepted as law" be-
fore it reaches conclusions that are defensible in law. 7 This approach is
15. Id. 206, at 108.
16. Lowe, supra note 12, at 73. See also Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of
Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185,
197 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (contending that "opportunities
[in the General Assembly] for expressing a clear position" on the legal status of humanitar-
ian intervention "have been ignored"). In a similar vein, the International Court of Justice was
faced with a "titanic tension between state practice and legal principle" in its Advisory Opinion,
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809, 836 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, concluding that the "chasm between practice and prin-
ciple may be bridged-and is bridged by the Court's Opinion"). I emphasize that this judicial
sensitivity to state conduct manifested itself in principle-that is to say that the Court identified
a specific method of law determination, one that it may not itself have followed with rigor or
sufficient precision in practice. Meron, for instance, has suggested that the Court in the Nicara-
gua Case "should be reproached for its near silence concerning the evidence and reasoning
supporting [its] conclusion" that both Articles 1 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are
representative of international custom. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS As CUSTOMARY LAW 37 (1989). For a further critical appraisal of how the Court con-
ducted its business on this matter in the same case, see Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary
International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L101, 102 (1987); Nikolaos Tsagourias, The Theory and
Praxis of Humanitarian Intervention 223 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Nottingham (England)) (on file with author) (claiming that the approach adopted by the Court
"concede[d] an unnecessary over-legitimization to governmental declarations and fails to appre-
hend the deeds"); GENNADII M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 93 (1993). Criticisms of the Court's application of its own stated method need to
be set against theories which have sought to explain the Court's approach by placing them in
their wider normative context. See Fredric L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J.
INT'LL. 146 (1987).
17. See I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38, para. 1. This position was reiterated in clear terms by the
Court in its judgment in Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29 (June 3), not-
withstanding the questionable drafting of the concept of custom in Article 38 of the Statute,
which refers to "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
Compare the view of ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND HOW WE USE IT 18 (1994), that "custom is the source to be applied, and ... it is prac-
tice which evidences custom." See also R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE
SEA5 (2d ed. 1988).
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one that coincides more readily with the nature of customary law and
the process of custom-formation in the international legal system."8 As
the principal judicial arm of the United Nations, the Court is charged
with the application of the law as it appears in practice and not as it ap-
pears in abstracto: the Court is responsible for recognizing normative
changes in state behavior in its institutional role as the eye-witness and
ultimate arbiter of international law in evolution.'9
In addition, the International Court of Justice showed itself more
able to appreciate the nuances of state practice in the Nicaragua Case in
1986, where it confirmed Resolution 2131 (XX) to be "only a statement
of political intention and not a formulation of law" and attested to the
legal nature of the principle of non-intervention in the later Resolution
2625 (XXV) of October 1970.20 The Court, however, then went on to
inquire into the "exact content" of the principle as well as the extent to
which it was supported by state practice.2' This inquiry represented an
honest endeavor by the Court to scrutinize dispassionately and with a
distinct sense of professional objectivity and detachment the trends of
state conduct in their wider historical context before determining their
precise consequences for international law. This has meant that the na-
ture of the Court's work is such that it is possible, if not probable, that
different conclusions and outcomes are reached by the Court in relation
to the self-same legal questions tackled and deliberated upon by the
General Assembly.
Notwithstanding these evident disparities in method, one despairing
consequence of this state of affairs is that the General Assembly, which
is able at any time to deliberate upon accepted, uncertain or controver-
sial legal principles, has refrained from dealing with the question of
humanitarian intervention either by itself or through vicarious means,
whereas the Court (with its preferred approach for determining lex lata)
operates under rigorous procedural (principally jurisdictional) con-
straints that do not allow it unfettered opportunities to give its expert
verdict on identical legal issues and questions, even when they are most
18. In the construction of treaties, it is an accepted canon of interpretation that "[tihere
shall be taken into account, together with the context.... any subsequent practice in the appli-
cation of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31 (3) (b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(emphasis added). For further discussion, see Eduardo Jimenex de Ardchaga, International Law
in the Past Third of a Century, I RECUEIL DES CouRs (Academe De Droit International) 1, 21
(1978).
19. The Statute of the International Court of Justice does recognize that this approach
"shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree
thereto' IC.J. STATurE art. 38, para. 2.
20. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 203, at 107.
21. Id. 1 205, at 108.
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needed. Even so, it should be recalled that, but for the International
Court of Justice, there would be no institutionalized judicial appraisal
within the United Nations system of whether the General Assembly, in
professing to declare existing laws, had slipped through the all-too
"porous fence" between the codification and development of interna-
tional law.22 Added to this, of course, is the ability of the Court to
evaluate deliberations of the General Assembly in the broader context of
other (perhaps even conflicting) manifestations of state practice and to
do so on legal questions which may not have been dealt with directly or
in sufficient detail by the General Assembly.
The Court's verdict in the Nicaragua Case (1986) makes clear that
the principle of non-intervention could admit to new exceptions in cus-
tomary international law where states, through their legal actions, deem
this appropriate. The Court in that case came to the conclusion that no
"general right of intervention in support of an opposition within another
state exists in contemporary international law,"'23 but it did so because
"states [had] not justified their conduct by reference to a new right of
intervention or a new exception to the principle of its prohibition, ' 2 and
not because this was not possible or arguable as a matter of law. In the
Nicaragua judgment, the Court found itself unable to formulate new
exceptions to or deviations from established principles or rules of inter-
national law because facts, legal arguments and empirical evidence were
not adduced and therefore the veritable threshold was not met, and not
because no such threshold existed. In essence, therefore, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice was prepared to explore the normative impact of
state practice in its seeming mission to liberate international law from
the General Assembly's perpetual "tyranny of phrases" ' on the principle
of non-intervention.
22. Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), 1987 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 39.
23. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 1 209, at 109.
24. Id. 1 207, at 109.
25. The term is used in the same spirit as it appears in the following passage by Lassa
Oppenheim:
As things are, there is scarcely a doctrine of the law of nations which is wholly
free from the tyranny of phrases. The so-called fundamental rights are their arena,
and the doctrines of state sovereignty and of equality of states are in large measure
dominated by them. Anyone who is in touch with the application of international
law in diplomatic practice hears from statesmen every day the complaint that
books put forth fanciful doctrines instead of the actual rules of law.
LASSA OPPENHEIM, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58, 59 (1921).
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III. REAPPRAISING THE ROLE OF POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Recent armed operations, some of which have assumed the integral
characteristics of classic humanitarian interventions, 26 have highlighted
the crucial importance of and need for a thorough legal assessment of
this practice in order to calculate its precise normative value. In the
main, traditional critics of the doctrine have built their case-not with-
out just cause or good reason-on the repeated abstinence by states
from the invocation of the right of humanitarian intervention in the pe-
riod of United Nations practice, especially in cases in which it would
have been propitious to do so.2 This approach is tantamount to that
which the Court adopted in the Nicaragua Case (1986) because it delves
into the actual practice of states to ascertain whether they have "justified
their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention or a new ex-
ception to the principle of its prohibition."28 Practice, accompanied by
requisite legal statements or stated convictions, confirms existing laws
or edges us towards new normative frontiers, or at least that is the impli-
cation.
Within the literature, the case made against the acceptance of hu-
manitarian intervention in international law is not, however, predicated
solely on the patterns or vicissitudes of state practice. There, the line of
attack also comprises a series of policy objections which have been used
to argue against any formal endorsement of humanitarian intervention
26. That is, they have involved the application of armed force for humanitarian protection
without the authorization of the United Nations. Where the United Nations has authorized force,
such as in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994), the intervention may be classified as a precedent
under the enforcement powers of the Security Council. They are not precedents under humani-
tarian intervention as it has traditionally been understood. See A.C. AREND & R.J. BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 113
(1993); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
27. The trilogy of pre-1990 case-studies which validate this claim are: the 1971 Indian
intervention in East Pakistan; Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in 1978; and finally, the
1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda. In this regard, see generally International Commis-
sion of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971, 8 INT'L COM. JURISTS REV. 59 (1972);
GARY KLINTWORTH, VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1989); S.K. Chatterjee, Some Legal Problems of Support Role in International Law: Tanza-
nia and Uganda, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 755 (1981). The common denominator of these
cases is that, "all three invaders had solid ground on which to rest a claim of legitimate hu-
manitarian intervention. Yet they ignored the doctrine, choosing instead to claim self-defense
from an armed attack, a claim not one of them could persuasively sustain. Their choice
hardly suggests confidence in the exculpatory power of a humanitarian motive." Farer, supra
note 16, at 193 (emphasis added). See also Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After
Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention By Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L.
275 (1973); Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD
POLITICS 95 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984); Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
28. Nicaraga Case, 1986 I.C.J. 207, at 109.
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as a matter of principle. The implication here, furnished by a ready and
vociferous chorus of critics, is that even where states sympathize with
humanitarian intervention in practice, the principle of non-intervention
should be prioritized in deference to the principles and purposes which
this law is designed to serve: the preservation of the sovereignty of
states and the peace and order which exists between states. The argu-
ment is made that established laws of such standing should not be
usurped by new considerations, notwithstanding the strength or appeal
of these counter-claims and concerns, because the policy reasons for
such laws continue to hold strong and should be applied in the long-
term interest.29
The next section of this article investigates these policy-driven ob-
jections to humanitarian intervention. Before embarking upon this
analysis, it should be restated that, in and of themselves, these objec-
tions should not be regarded as a substitute modus operandi for
determining the status of humanitarian intervention in international law.
Loyal to Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, our first port-of-call as scholars-acting as authorities and arbiters
of the law or in our quasi-judicial capacities-must be to locate
"evidence of a general practice accepted as law" pace the approach
adopted in the Nicaragua Case (1986). This is not-and should not be
read as-a denial of the valid, appropriate, and responsible role which
such considerations have in the legal process, but this occurs within an
intricate matrix of factors, comprising a plenitude of legal sources and
authorities. Moderation, therefore, is what is called for when according
significance to these policies: their application and impact require bal-
anced judgement as well as a full appreciation of the normative
context in which such considerations operate. Designed for applica-
tion when state practice is not definitive on a given matter," policy
considerations of the nature discussed in this article should not be
29. For example, Louis Henkin has proposed that while "often irresistible, the international
legal system ought not to approve [the right of humanitarian intervention] in principle." Louis
Henkin, Remarks on Biafra, Bengal, and Beyond: International Responsibility and Genocidal
Conflict, 66 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 95, 96 (1972) (emphasis added); see also Kaiyan Homi
Kaikobad, 'lus Ad Bellum': Legal Imperatives of the Iran-Iraq War, in THE GULF WAR OF
1980-88: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 51, 56 (Ige F. Decker
& Harry F.G. Post eds., 1992).
30. See IAN BROwNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 323
(1963) (according to whom such objections to any departures from the principle of non-
intervention become important where there is an "ambiguous state of the authorities"). Be-
fore the International Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5), policies were built into legal arguments in an area where there
was "no clear authority [and] no express judicial decision." Eli Lauterpacht, The Place of
Policy in International Law, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 23, 25 (1972).
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permitted to constitute a barrier to the examination of state practice,
because it is imperative that we determine how much more or less con-
clusive in legal terms developments in state practice are with respect to
the right of humanitarian intervention.
In any event, and as will become apparent, these policy objections
as they have been advanced over the years are neither conclusive nor
sustainable grounds of objection to humanitarian intervention when
considered in a critical and contextual perspective: each of these objec-
tions have themselves become deserving targets for criticism."'
Somewhat like Newton's third law of motion in physics, each objection
(as presented here) to humanitarian intervention has generated an equal
and opposite counter-objection and cannot be relied upon to provide a
definitive answer to the taxing question of the status of humanitarian
intervention in modern international law. Such objections also need to
be set against policy considerations which construct the case for a right
of humanitarian intervention as an interim remedial action for threat-
ened or endangered peoples, populations or minorities.32 What results
from this volley of policy considerations (as advanced in the legal lit-
erature) is a less than enthralling exchange where conflicting policies,
and the arguments which they inspire, collide in their feeble endeavor to
31. By way of analogy, policy-based arguments in English law were considered and re-
jected by the House of Lords in McLoughlin v O'Brian, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 410 because they
were not "of sufficient plausibility or merit." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 28-29
(1986).
32. Mohamed Sahnoun, the skilled Algerian diplomat who was asked to conduct a fact-
finding mission in war-torn and famine-stricken Somalia in 1992, concluded that "if the
international community had intervened earlier and more effectively in Somalia, much of the
catastrophe that has unfolded could have been avoided." SOMALIA: THE MISSED OPPOR-
TUNITIES at xiii (1994). It has been estimated that there were between 30,000 and 50,000
non-combatant fatalities in the period November 1991 through to March 1992. Walter
Clarke, Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates, in LEARNING FROM SOMALIA: THE LESSONS
OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 3, 5 (Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997).
So general considerations of humanity, and possibly even the deterrence of acts of internal
aggression and repression, are powerful forces behind policy-based arguments which suggest
the need for an acceptance of some form of humanitarian intervention. See WILLIAM V.
HARCOURT, LETTERS ON SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1863); Tom J. Farer,
Humanitarian Intervention: The View From Charlottesville, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 164 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); Michael J. Bazyler, Re-
examining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Atrocities in Kampu-
chea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 618-19 (1987); Nirmala Chandrahasan, Use of
Force to Ensure Humanitarian Relief-A South Asian Precedent Examined, 42 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 664, 672 (1993); Thomas G. Weiss, On the Brink of A New Era? Humanitarian
Interventions, 1991-1994, in BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 3, 8 (Donald C.F. Daniel
& Bradd C. Hayes eds., 1995). See, e.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
DIGNITY (1950); W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article
2 (4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984).
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provide a breakthrough on where humanitarian intervention stands as a
matter of law.
The significance and force of these considerations ultimately de-
pends on the extent of normative authority of accumulated state practice
and precedents at a particular point in time, on the individual merits of
such considerations as well as the nature and strength of counter-
considerations and, of course, on the stage of the legal process at which
they appear:
When a legal adviser presents or defends a claim, there is no
doubt about his role-it is to achieve the results sought by his
client. When he acts as a counselor, he advises on ways of using
law and on the risks involved in proposed or alternative courses
of action. Obviously, in this role as well he must have in mind
the goals of his client; and he must consider the causes and con-
sequences of whatever decision is taken and the various factors
involved in reaching a solution to the problem .... But a prob-
lem arises for the legal adviser when he assumes a somewhat
different role (perhaps as part of his counseling) and when as an
authority on the law, he is asked for a legal opinion, either to
advise his client as to what is the rule of law and whether it ap-
plies to given circumstances or .... to give legal rulings with
some degree of authority in, one might say, a quasi-judicial ca-
pacity.... [In this situation, the legal adviser] is not being asked
to argue a case or to design a legal strategy to attain his client's
ends; he is called upon for an opinion or ruling on the applica-
bility of law, or, more precisely, on the existence of a legal
obligation or right. It is moreover expected that he would pro-
vide an "objective" decision, that is, one that does not simply
reflect his own likes or dislikes but is well founded in "law." He
is in that respect in the same position as a judge or, for that
matter, a disinterested and objective scholar. Would it not com-
promise the integrity of his function if he permitted "policy" to
influence his decision as to the existence of a legal right?33
33. Oscar Schachter, The Place of Policy in International Law, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
5 (1972). In answering this question, Professor Schachter draws the important distinction be-
tween "rule-orientated lawyers" and "policy-orientated lawyers"; the former are those who seek
to resolve disputes "solely by reference to rules of law or master rules of recognition" whereas
the latter are those who use the legal process "to achieve its social ends." Where a policy identi-
fies a "preference or preferred outcome, whether expressed as a general goal or a specific results
or as a principle of fairness of justice" (as in the third configuration mentioned at supra note 4),
that policy may not only be "relevant but often decisive." Id. at 6; see also Rosalyn Higgins,
Policy and Impartiality: The Uneasy Relationship in International Law, 23 INT'L ORG. 914
(1969).
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More fundamentally, scholars need to bear in mind that the right of
humanitarian intervention is not (in practice) a litigious right. That is to
say that its position in law is unlikely to be pleaded or challenged before
a court of law. It is difficult, for instance, to envisage how humanitarian
intervention will emerge as the brunt of legal proceedings in a conten-
tious case before, for example, the International Court of Justice given
the jurisdictional obstacles which exist as well as the multilateral nature
of a good share of these kinds of military operations?' The mechanics of
inter-state relations on such matters does not therefore augur well for
litigation on the specific issue of humanitarian intervention. This is par-
ticularly agonizing given the Court's declared preparedness to
investigate the normative outcome of state practice in its 1986 Nicara-
gua ruling. In contrast and as has been emphasized, although the
General Assembly does not operate under similar procedural constraints
or inhibitions, it has deliberately chosen to abstain from a thorough as-
sessment of state practice on this issue in favor of venerating and
publicizing its own legal schema. Perhaps one possible solution would
be for the General Assembly, in recognition of the limitations of its own
34. Although, one commentator has concluded that the Nicaragua Case
unmistakably places the Court in the camp of those who claim that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention is without validity. Under that doctrine a state could rely
on an alleged exception to the principle prohibiting unilateral resort to armed force
by one state against another, where the purpose of its intervention was to protect
persons (other than its own citizens) from serious and widespread violations of
their human rights.
Nigel S. Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World
Court, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 321, 332 (1989); see also Christine Gray, After the Ceasefire:
Iraq, The Security Council and the Use of Force, 1994 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 135, 163. How-
ever, it is maintained here that, in the Nicaragua Case, the Court was not concerned with the
right of humanitarian intervention: this was not pleaded before the Court, nor was the doc-
trine subjected to any test of advocacy, nor, arguably, was this the nature of military
operations as they occurred in practice (i.e. iniervention to protect human rights is a much
broader conceptual configuration than humanitarian intervention and may more properly be
equated with what is known as political--or ideological-intervention). The critical obser-
vation is made by Murphy that the actions "actually at issue"-which involved the mining of
ports, the destruction of oil installations, and the training, arming, and equipping of the con-
tras-in the Nicaragua Case were "hardly of the type normally associated with humanitarian
intervention." MURPHY, supra note 1, at 129-30. Admittedly, had the Court considered the
legal status of humanitarian intervention at that moment in time, "it would have been hard-
pressed to find much evidence to substantiate [the proposition] that such a right existed
within the realm of international law." Dino Kritsiotis, Review Essay: Developing Ap-
proaches towards Legitimizing Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds, 2 J. ARMED
CONFLICT L. 91, 102 (1997). Indeed, it was even the view of the United States that its actions
in Nicaragua were justified on the basis of the right of self-defense, not the right of humani-
tarian intervention-and these actions must therefore be judged on the basis of the
justification advanced and not on some presumed or supposed alternative justification (per
the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 1 266,
at 134).
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capacities, to request the International Court of Justice to consider the
matter as part of its advisory jurisdiction and deliver an advisory opin-
ion which takes account of the recent developments in state practice as
well as contemporary legal analyses on the question of humanitarian
intervention.35 Failing this approach, the duty is even more accentuated
upon international law scholars to calculate the normative worth of re-
cent developments on this particular question.
What should be borne in mind throughout is that the "real source of
normative force of international relations" should not be eclipsed by
statements of immutable principle or policy when a proper legal investi-
gation of state practice is called for in order to "systemize the law [such]
that rules are produced in a clear form."36 This means that it is impera-
tive that this controversial issue is addressed in an appropriate legal
forum and re-assessed on a regular basis, a challenge to be met in chief
by international legal researchers. It was exactly this clarion call that
was sounded a generation ago by Franck and Rodley-significantly,
critics of the right of humanitarian intervention-who urged:
International law is not static .... International law, as a branch
of behavioral science, as well as of normative philosophy, may
treat [an] event as the harbinger of a new law that will, hence-
forth, increasingly govern interstate relations. This places
responsibility on international lawyers, particularly on those
who counsel governments, educate publics, and interpret events
in print. On the one hand, international lawyers must not be
slow to accept changes which are actually occurring; neither
should they faddishly accept as law any event merely because it
has occurred. International law includes but it is also both more
and less than the total of successful initiatives by states. The
international lawyer must impose on events his historical sense
of their meaning and their relationship to other events; he must
also bring to bear a sense of policy perceived from the perspec-
tive of mankind. 7
35. According to Article 65 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court
may "give an Advisory Opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may
be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request." See U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1 (providing the General Assembly as one such
body authorized to request the Court to give an advisory opinion on "any legal question").
36. Lowe, supra note 12, at 72.
37. Franck & Rodley, supra note 27, at 303. The interesting question is raised of how both
of these scholars perceive the legal significance of the interventions that have taken place since
1990. Franck has noted that "Beijing did not object when 13,000 U.S., British, French, Dutch,
Spanish, Italian and Australian troops, without UN. authorization, entered northern Iraq to pro-
tect the Kurds." Thomas M. Franck, FAIRNESs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 236
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For this very reason, Sir Robert Y. Jennings, onetime President and
former Judge of the International Court of Justice, has compared the
work, influence and importance of international legal scholars to the
juriconsults of classical Roman law: "In fact it is safe to say that there is
probably no other system of law in which individual workers and schol-
ars enjoy such telling influence over the shaping and the content of the
rules and even of the principles of law."38 That "shaping" of international
law derives, in the first instance, from our regard of state practice ac-
cepted by states as law; the "sense of policy" of which Franck and
Rodley wrote is a relevant consideration but must be carefully moni-
tored lest it gains a stranglehold over the genuine normative convictions
of states---especially where the quality and reasoning of such policy
objections are themselves open to question.
IV. POLICY OBJECTIONS To HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION EXAMINED
A. The Abuse of the Right of Humanitarian Intervention
The most common criticism leveled at the right of humanitarian in-
tervention is that its incorporation into the system of the law of nations
would enhance the opportunities for the abusive use of force, the long-
term effect of which would be to bring the international normative sys-
tem into disrepute. Acceptance of humanitarian intervention, it is
warned, would open the door to a situation in which its advocates would
not be able to "devise a means that is both conceptually and instrumen-
tally credible to separate the few sheep of legitimate humanitarian
intervention from the herds of goats which can too easily slip through."39
States would, the argument is made, launch "heroic" missions to save
and protect persecuted populations but would, in actual fact, only use
the cover of altruism to use force to realize alternative and suspect
(1995) (emphasis added). For his part, Rodley concedes that there is "some current state practice
that could perhaps be invoked to justify an embryonic exception to this broadly conceived non-
intervention rule. This relates to states where the total fabric of government has collapsed, lead-
ing to situations characterized by anarchy, violence and non-protection of national or foreign
rights." Nigel S. Rodley, Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Popula-
tions: The Legal Framework, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS 14, 24 (Nigel S. Rodley
ed., 1992) (citing the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, in August 1990, as one of the "principal
exemplars" of this trend).
38. Sir Robert Y. Jennings, International Lawyers and the Progressive Development of In-
ternational Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 413, 413 (Jerzy Makarcyk ed., 1996).
39. Franck & Rodley, supra note 27, at 284.
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ambitions,40 such as the change of government in the target state or even
as part of an ignominious strategy of territorial self-aggrandizement.
Even human rights scholars have registered their concerns in this
regard, warning against the dangers inherent in the formal acceptance of
the right of humanitarian intervention. Henkin, for example, has said
that humanitarian reasons are "easy to fabricate" and that every case of
intervention has been "justified on some kind of humanitarian ground. 4'
The toll which such a "right" would exact on the international normative
order would thus, it is alleged, be inestimable: "Violations of human
rights.are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible to remedy
them by external use of force, there would be no law to forbid the use of
force by almost any state against almost any other."42 Moreover, in an
age in which all states are, at least in the formal sense, sovereign and
equal, recognition of the legal right of humanitarian intervention would
be a certain temptation for "big power intervention on the opposite sides
of a wide range of domestic disputes., 43 This power differential, it is
said, would be teased out and exacerbated should humanitarian inter-
vention be regarded as permissible in law.
History has shown that these concerns are legitimate and that they
deserve full and serious consideration. The most notorious invocation of
the right of humanitarian intervention in modern history occurred when
Adolf Hitler claimed that German force was necessary to protect the
ethnic Germans resident in Czechoslovakia who had been "subject[ed]
to the 'brutal will [of] destruction [by] the Czechs' [and] whose be-
havior was 'madness' [that had] led to over 120,000 refugees being
forced to flee the country .... while the 'security of more than [three
million] human beings' was at stake."44 By no means is this an isolated
40. Richard Falk, The United States and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in the Inter-
nal Affairs of Independent States, 5 HOW. L.J. 163, 167 (1959).
41. Henkin, supra note 29, at 96.
42. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 145.
43. Franck & Rodley, supra note 27, at 304. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 30, at 340-41
(arguing that the insitution of humanitarian intervention "did not conspicuously enhance state
relations and was applied only against weak states. It belongs to an era of unequal relations");
Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Uganadan Conflict,
'Humanitarian Intervention'Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 859, 862 (1981) (discussing
the right of humanitarian intervention as "simply a cloak of legality for the use of brute force by
a powerful state against a weaker one"); D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 890 (5th ed., 1998). Compare the position of Lillich who argues, in the
context of the right to protect nationals abroad, "these rules generally operated in the inter-
ests of the smaller countries as well." Lillich, supra note 1, at 328.
44. Franck & Rodley, supra note 27, at 284 (citing the official justification given for the
use of force in the letter from Reich Chancellor Hitler to Prime Minister Chamberlain in The
Crisis in Czechoslovakia, April 24-October 31, 1938, 44 INT'L CONCILIATION 433 (1938)).
Although, at that time, liberal opinion respected the need to discuss Germany's concern about
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example.4 ' The prospect of the abusive application of humanitarian in-
tervention is thus a very real and potent consideration but it is also one
that requires a measured and reasoned response. Appealing to extreme
solutions or responding in apocalyptic terms is undesirable. Professor
Rosalyn Higgins (as she then was) has argued:
Many writers do argue against the lawfulness of humanitarian
intervention today. They make much of the fact that in the past
the right has been abused. It undoubtedly has. But then so have
there been countless abusive claims to the right to self-defense.
That does not lead us to say that there should be no right of self-
defense today. We must face the reality that we live in a decen-
tralized international legal order, where claims may be made
either in good faith or abusively. We delude ourselves if we
think that the role of norms is to remove the possibility of abu-
sive claims ever being made.46
The common sense of this approach has appealed from earlier
times:
In advocating recognition of a limited right of unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention, this author is not unaware of the serious
dangers this approach entails, particularly the risk of abusive
intervention. But, as an early proponent of humanitarian inter-
vention pointed out almost a century ago: "It is a big mistake, in
general, to stop short of recognition of an inherently just princi-
ple, [merely] because of the possibility of non-genuine
intervention. 47
The particular concern identified here-that is, of the potential
abuse of force-should not therefore be used to argue for the outright
denial of humanitarian intervention. Rather, such an argument would
call for the definition of indicia for the regulation and the conditions for
the lawful exercise of the right of humanitarian intervention in prac-
the ill-treatment of her minorities in Eastern Europe. See NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY
987 (1996).
45. See, e.g., Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article II of the Covenants, 12
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 2289 (1931) (discussing the Japanese justification of her occupation
of Manchuria); PErER MALANCZUK, HUMANITARIAN INTERvENTION AND THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE USE OF FORCE 1 (1993) (providing other examples of past abuses of humanitarian interven-
tion).
46. HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 247.
47. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 269 (1974)
(citing Rolin-Jacquemyns, Note sur la Thdorie du Droit d'Intervention, 8 REVUE DE DROrr
INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPARE 675, 679 (1876)).
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tice."' For this to be the case, whether states regard some form of hu-
manitarian intervention as permissible in principle within international
law must first be determined. If so, then this right, like that of self-
defense, will be subject to "regulation and evaluation by the law" on
each and every occasion that it is invoked.49
Thus, two separate but related matters for investigation have sur-
faced: whether humanitarian intervention is a permissible head of
intervention under international law is a different inquiry from whether
its invocation in a specific case is justified or lawful (assuming, of
course, that the right of humanitarian intervention is regarded as permis-
sible prima facie in the latter case). As with the right of self-defense, for
a claim of humanitarian intervention to succeed, the case made for the
use of force and the extent of the force actually applied will need to be
judged in light of the prevailing circumstances. If, on the other hand,
humanitarian intervention is not considered to be a permissible head of
intervention in international law, then its invocation in a given instance
is likely to be regarded as unlawful per se, unless, of course, there is
significant support for a change in the legal position so as to allow it to
become an acceptable head of intervention."
Therefore, the assertion that armed force has been used on the basis
of humanitarian intervention does not entail its automatic or even ulti-
mate acceptance in a given case. The more considered response to these
48. As W. Michael Reisman has suggested, "the challenge to contemporary lawyers is
not to engage in automatic denunciations of unilateral resorts to coercion by states as viola-
tions of Article 2 (4) [of the United Nations Charter]. They must begin to develop a set of
criteria for appraising the lawfulness of unilateral resorts to coercion." Reisman, supra note
32, at 643. However, Reisman also suggests that "[iun the construction of Article 2 (4), at-
tention must always be given to the spirit of the Charter and not simply to the letter of a
particular provision," id. at 645, when what is envisioned here-because of the normative
framework of the law on the use of force-is the right of humanitarian intervention as a
customary law exception to the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2 (4) of
the Charter. This, of course, is subject to the empirical evidence provided from state practice
and, as such, places an important burden of proof on the intervening state(s) to demonstrate
that such evidence exists. See Farer, supra note 16, at 192; Ian Brownlie, The Use of Force in
Self-Defense, 1961 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 195 (asserting a "strong presumption of illegal-
ity whenever force is used as an instrument of national policy").
49. HERSCH LAuTrERPACT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
180 (1933).
50. This is what Franck and Rodley have labeled "the harbinger of a new law that will,
henceforth, increasingly govern interstate relations," supra note 27, at 303, and constitutes
one of the classic dilemmas of the concept of custom in international law. See Roy Goode,
Usage and Reception in Transnational Commercial Law, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 9 (1997)
("The problem with the requirement of the observance of custom from a sense of legally binding
obligation is that it is based either on circularity or on paradox, for it presupposes a belief in an
existing legal duty which if correct would make the belief itself superfluous and if erroneous
would convert non-law into law through error"). For a general discussion on the role of custom
in international law, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 238-45 (1980).
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concerns about the potential abusive invocation of the right of humani-
tarian intervention is to install various safeguards for observation by
states-such as to recall helpful and informative precedents of the right
in action (assuming the right exists) as well as to enunciate the relevant
legal principles such as those of necessity, proportionality and the hu-
manitarian rationale of the operation-which allows the lawfulness of
the use of force in practice to be judged and the abusive application of
force to be combatted." Such safeguards against abuse are essential be-
cause "[w]hether a claim invoking any given norm is made in good faith
or abusively will always require contextual analysis by appropriate deci-
sion-makers-by the Security Council, by the International Court of
Justice, by various international bodies."52
Of course, the inevitable claim will be made that the right of hu-
manitarian intervention is open to much greater possibilities of abuse in
practice than is the right of self-defense, particularly since the latter
right is now regulated by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. But
abuses of this magnitude will in fact serve to facilitate determinations of
unlawful action because there is minimal difficulty in exposing such
egregious violations of the regulation of force for what they are. The
inimitable, though modest, contribution of what Oscar Schachter once
called "the invisible college of international lawyers" will help achieve
this.53 Christopher Greenwood, for instance, has praised the coalition
intervention to protect the imperiled Kurdish population in northern Iraq
in 1991 on the basis that it was "a far cry from cases like Cambodia, in
which the intervening state overthrew the government of its neighbor, or
Bangladesh, in which India's intervention led to the creation of a new
51. For example, the international law of peace and armed conflict both articulate the
principle that the use of force can never be used to acquire title to territory, the purpose of
which is to ensure that in the application of force by states for whatever reason(s), "not an
atom of sovereignty [invests] in the authority of the occupant." Lassa Oppenheim, The Legal
Relations between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants, 33 LAw Q. REV. 363, 364
(1917). See also G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 6, which provides an authoritative statement of
customary international law: "[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by
another state resulting from the threat or use of force" and that "[n]o territorial acquisition re-
sulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal:' This statement is confirmed
by laws regulating armed conflicts. See, e.g., Regulations of the Convention Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43, 100 B.FS.P. 338 (discussing the
temporary nature of any military control); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; First Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
52. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 247; see also Lowe, supra note 12, at 72.




state. 54 Jurists and scholars are therefore committed as much to exam-
ine and determine the extent to which the law is complied with in
practice as to define and determine what it is in a particular case.
Moreover, the multilateral application of armed force for humani-
tarian protection in Liberia in 1990 and then again in northern Iraq in
1991 demonstrates that the much vaunted danger of abuse may not be as
great, pervasive, or as severe as once envisaged.5 The latter of these in-
terventions is a choice determination that there are indeed prima facie
cases where some form of humanitarian intervention is operable without
the occurrence of abuse-such as the unseating of an incumbent gov-
ernment or the forcible dismemberment or permanent occupation of
sovereign territory. President Saddam Hussein remained in office and in
power after allied forces entered Iraqi territory in 1991 on their hu-
manitarian mission, despite significant international condemnation of
his leadership and foreign policy. Furthermore, the lesson of these inter-
ventions, which occurred in quick succession, suggests that where the
actions of a regional association or an ex tempore coalition of states can
be reduced to the common denominator of humanitarian need, the dy-
namic of such operations countenances against the abusive, or unlawful,
use of force.56 States working together in this manner to facilitate the
54. Christopher Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the
Rule of Law, 55 MOD. L. REv. 153, 177 (1992). This analysis is without prejudice to the status
of the right of humanitarian intervention at that point in time and is used to demonstrate how
(assuming the right were endorsed in international law) it is possible to make substantive
distinctions between one "invocation" of the right in action and another.
55. Although, it should be noted, the creation of a no-fly zone in southern Iraq on August
26, 1992-without the authorization of the Security Council-met with a hostile response from
Algeria, Jordan, Syria and Yemen. Serious reservations were also expressed by Egypt and Saudi
Arabia. See 38 KEESING's REc. WORLD EVENTs 39068 (1992). Furthermore, in September
1996, the United States extended the southern no-fly zone by 110 kilometers to the thirty-third
parallel. It is significant to note that the episode exposed greater differences in world opinion:
France and Russia registered their concern about the nature of American policy. See Provoca-
tion and Response, ECONOMIST,'Sept. 7-14, 1996, at 37; see also Nigel D. White, Commentary
on the Protection of the Kurdish Safe-Haven: Operation Desert Strike, 1 J. ARMED CONFLICT L.
197 (1996) (providing a concise legal analysis of the issue); infra note 95.
56. Brownlie regards the multilaterization of the French intervention in Syria in 1860 as an
assurance of the "disinterestedness" of the prime mover behind the operation. BROWNLIE, supra
note 30, at 340. This multilateralization occurred in the form of an international convention,
signed by Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and Turkey on August 3, 1860. But compare the
positions of MURPHY, supra note 1, at 54, and Pogany, infra note 86, who believe that the
international action was sanctioned by the Sublime Port and, as such, does not stand as a
precedent of humanitarian intervention, even though the intervening powers asserted the
right and regarded its exercise as inevitable. See Stephen Kloepfer, The Syrian Crisis, 1860-
61: A Case Study in Classic Humanitarian Intervention, 1985 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 246, 255,
258.
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humanitarian objectives of a shared armed operation is helpful,57 but this
coordination should not be used to undermine the general case for uni-
lateral humanitarian intervention. This is because other (political and
economic) considerations-such as the human, material and financial
costs involved-also act as constraining elements and argue against pro-
longed interventions and the deviation from any putative humanitarian
mandate set forth in international law. The stakes are indeed higher
where the unilateral application of force in the name of humanitarian
intervention is contemplated: even so, the principle of humanitarian in-
tervention (if accepted on its merits by states) must mean that the use of
force is not only permitted in the name of a greater good but is also
controlled and hopefully contained by it.
B. The Selective Application of Humanitarian Intervention
There is indeed much to be said for the old aphorism that like cases
must be treated alike because it is one of the elementary characteristics
which forges claims and perceptions of a fair and just legal system. One
of the enduring strengths of the law is that it abides by the rule of law
which prescribes, in Dicey's famous formulation, "equality before the
law."58 This idea of comparable treatment in comparable cases is in es-
sence the reasoning and argument behind the second principled
objection to humanitarian intervention which argues that, if accepted in
law, the right of humanitarian intervention would introduce endless op-
portunities for the selective use of force in cases of humanitarian need
and this in turn would endanger the crucial kinship between interna-
tional law and the rule of law: "[H]umanitarian intervention would be
highly selective and nearly always dictated by political and strategic
interest."59 Indeed, practice has shown that "widespread torture" occurs
"in a large number of countries that appear blissfully unaware of their
[apparent] vulnerability to legitimate intervention."60 Such are the in-
57. Antoine Rougier, La thiorie de l'intervention d'humanit, 17 REVUE G.NIRALE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 468, 500 (1910).
58. A.V DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CON-
sTrrUTnON 203 (1885).
59. Brownlie, supra note 1, at 25-26; see also W.E. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (8th
ed. 1866) (expressing concern that "the principle is not even intended to be equally applied to
the cases covered by it").
60. Farer, supra note 16, at 192; see also Franck & Rodley, supra note 27, at 296 ("If there
is, indeed, an historic international 'right' of forceful humanitarian intervention, that will ....
come as a surprise to Biafrans, Rhodesians, and South Africans"); Reisman, supra note 1, at 431
(describing the "hollow victory" of the "normative triumph" of recent times because "as the
license of the law in this area has been extended, so too has the reluctance to act by the states




variable hazards that would allegedly accompany any legal recognition
of the right of humanitarian intervention.
While this argument is correct to highlight the selective and partisan
nature of the operation of humanitarian intervention in practice, this ar-
gument misconceives the theoretical composition and traditional under-
standing of humanitarian intervention in international law, which has
been framed as a right of states and not as an obligation requiring state
action. Inherent in the very conception of a right is an element of selec-
tivity in the exercise of that right." This is in keeping with the right-
holder's sovereign discretion to decide whether or not to exercise the
right in question and commit its armed forces to foreign territories and
explains why it is the right of-rather than the right to-humanitarian
intervention that has taken hold in practice as well as legal scholarship.
By and large, where states have exercised the right in the distant past,
they have argued that they have done so because of some legal entitle-
ment and not through some sense of legal duty.62 We may query how
satisfactory this approach is, but the case remains that even in operations
which arguably typify humanitarian intervention in recent times, the
legal conviction of participating states has been expressed in terms of an
entitlement and not in terms of a duty. The West African intervention in
Liberia in 1990 was designed-in the words of the intervening states-
to curtail "the massive destruction of property and the massacre by all
61. See, for example, WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As
APPtUED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1919), when he wrote of the "privilege" to do something.
This privilege entailed a fundamental discretion as to whether or not to exercise a given right,
such as the "privilege (or right) of self-defense" in the domestic order. Id. at 33; see also Arthur
L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 165 (1919). By way of analogy,
the right of collective self-defense in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allows states-it
does not oblige them-to resort to forcible measures in collective self-defense of a threatened or
injured state. Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29
HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 22 (1988) (discussing the significance of the legal right of self-defense). For
French political thinking and legal doctrine, see generally, MARIO BETTATI, LE DROIT
D'INGRENCE: MUTATION DE L'ORDRE INTERNATIONAL (1996); Bill Bowrin& The 'Droit et
Devoir D'Jngirence': A Timely New Remedy for Africa?, 7 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493
(1995).
62. One should be aware of the emerging political rhetoric which seeks to identify a
"new approach to intervention [that has] incrementally appeared in the past two decades,"
which awards the international community "the right, indeed the responsibility, to concern
itself with human rights within states." Warren Zimmermann, Bad Blood, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
May 28, 1998, at 39. This development should be placed within the context of the actual
wording and interpretations of established conventional regimes. See notes 115, 116 and
accompanying text. Statements of legal principle need to be dissected from statements of politi-
cal rhetoric, exemplified by the emotive words of President Roosevelt, which he wrote in 1904
in the context of the Spanish-American War of 1898: "Brutal wrong-doing, or impotence, which
results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society may finally require intervention by
some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty"
quoted in JOHN BASSETT MOORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 262 (1918).
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the parties [to the conflict] of thousands of innocent civilians including
foreign nationals, women and children."63 No statement was made in this
case (or indeed in the leading precedents of the nineteenth century) to
the effect that the humanitarian intervention occurred pursuant to some
pressing legal obligation or requirementl"
With this consideration in mind, the argument has been made that if
humanitarian intervention is in principle deemed to be acceptable to the
international community, humanitarian intervention can lawfully occur
only where a mandate for the use of force is forthcoming from the Secu-
rity Council. 6' According to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
there are two permissible instances for the use of force: enforcement
action of the Security Council under Article 42 and the right of individ-
ual and collective self-defense under Article 51. Chapter VIII, however,
does recognize the role of regional organizations in the "maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action"
(Article 52) and for enforcement action under the authority of the Secu-
rity Council (Article 53). No right of humanitarian intervention (as
understood in its classic sense) was envisaged within this framework,
and it is on record that states have not been receptive to incorporating de
facto humanitarian interventions under the head of self-defense.6 So,
according to the strict text and paradigmatic law of the United Nations
Charter, Chapter VII (Article 42 in particular) provides the sole viable
legal basis for such actions."7 This arrangement, it has been asserted,6 8
would formalize the legal justification for humanitarian intervention by
63. First Session of the Standing Mediation Committee: Final Communiqud, Economic
Community of West African States, Aug. 1990, 6 (on file with author); see also Georg Nolte,
Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict, 53/3
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 603 (1993).
64. See, e.g., R.W. SETON-WATSON, BRITAIN IN EUROPE, 1789-1914, at 419-20 (1938)
(discussing French intervention in Syria in 1860); David S. Bogen, The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention: United States Policy in Cuba (1898) and in Dominican Republic (1965), 7 HARV.
INT'L L. CLUB J. 296 (1966); STOWELL, supra note 7, at 481; see also supra note 62 and ac-
companying text.
65. See Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW
AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 197 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J.
Scheffer eds., 1991); Jost Delbrck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention under the
Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 889-91 (1992). The Charter envisages
enforcement action by regional arrangements or agencies, but, according to Article 53 of the
United Nations Charter, "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements
or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." Theodor Meron,
Commentary on Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER 212, 213 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
66. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
67. In which case these actions are not, technically speaking, humanitarian interventions in
the classic sense of the term. See supra notes 1, 26, and accompanying text.
68. See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 381.
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subsuming it within the enforcement powers of the Security Council
which would, at one and the same time, minimize the opportunities for
the selective, ad hoc application of force by states in cases of humani-
tarian crisis.
Or so theory would have it. For the authorization of the use of force
to occur under Article 42, the Security Council is required to determine
that there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, which articulates
this requirement, is worded in suitably mandatory language: that the
Security Council "shall" make such findings and this may be taken to
introduce the requisite degree of consistency of treatment of similar
cases of humanitarian catastrophe. Experience, however, has shown that
the Security Council considers that such determinations result from the
exercise of its unfettered discretion and not necessarily in accordance
with pre-determined, objective criteria.6 Even where the Security Coun-
cil makes the requisite procedural finding under Article 39, the Security
Council is not then in law obliged to authorize the use of force under
Article 42: the Charter recognizes that this issue lies within the deci-
sion-making prerogative of the Security Council .
Proposing Security Council authorization as the preferable legal
route for forcible humanitarian action therefore comes with its own
share of problems and difficulties-and these are not inconsiderable.
Questions of double standards which face the United Nations in the exe-
cution of its legal and institutional responsibilities are more serious than
those leveled against states acting on the basis of some legal right or
entitlement. The credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations as a
global institution with universal appeal lie in the balance when it de-
cides that Libya is a threat to the peace for failing to surrender suspected
terrorists for trial but not Afghanistan 7' and when it chooses to author-
69. See, for example, the resolution adopted by the Security Council against Libya, infra
note 7 1.
70. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that measures pro-
vided for in Article 41 would be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security").
71. Osama Bin Laden, suspected of participating in the attempted assassination of Egyp-
tian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995 and in the bombing of American
targets in Saudi Arabia in 1996, has been given shelter by the Taleban Islamic militia in the
Afghan city of Kandahar. The position of Afghan authorities is that this sheltering is not in vio-
lation of international law. See Christopher Thomas, Taleban Shelters Islamic 'Terrorist,' TIMES
(London), May 10, 1997, at 18. The Security Council did, however, adopt limited measures
against the Sudan for its apparent involvement in the assassination attempt. See S.C. Res. 1054,
U.N. SCOR, 3660th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1054 (1996); S.C. Res. 1070, U.N. SCOR,
3690th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1070 (1996); but cf. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992), in which the Security Council determined that the
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ize the use of force against unconstitutional governments in Haiti but
not in Nigeria or Sierra Leone.72 The problem is compounded because
the United Nations Charter does not envisage the possibility of judicial
scrutiny of Security Council action,73 and, of course, by the very nature
of the political beast that is the Security Council.74
failure by the Libyan government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renuncia-
tion of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and
effectively to the requests contained in Resolution 731 (1992), [in which the Secu-
rity Council decided that Libya should meet the requests of the United States and
the United Kingdom to surrender two Libyans suspected of participation in the
bombing of Pan American Flight 103 on 22 December 1988] constitute[d] a threat
to international peace and security
and imposed extensive diplomatic and economic sanctions as a result. These sanctions have
met with increasing opposition. See Ian Black, Britain Fends Off Calls to End Libyan Sanc-
tions, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 26, 1997, at 16.
72. See Ian Brownlie, International Law in the Changing World Order, in PERSPECTIVES
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 49-54 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1995). By unanimous decision,
however, the Security Council imposed only oil, arms and travel sanctions on Sierra Leone after
"the military junta ha[d] not taken steps to allow the restoration of the democratically-elected
Government and a return to [the] constitutional order" that the junta usurped in May 1997. S.C.
Res. 1132 U.N. SCOR, 3822d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (1997). See Sanctions on Sierra
Leone, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 9, 1997, at 14. This decision is a response that echoes
part of its strategy in dealing with similar political situation in Haiti after the 1991 coup
d'itat there, but differs from its handling of the constitutional crisis that has unfolded in
Nigeria since June 1993.
73. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1996); Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Proce-
dures, 5 EuR. J. INT'L L. 89 (1994); Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and
the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1993). The International Court of Justice has empha-
sized that, under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, decisions of the Security Council are
legally binding, including controversial determinations. See Ruth Gordon, United Nations Inter-
vention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 581-86
(1994); cf. Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is
there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?
46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 309 (1997).
In recent litigation, the International Court of Justice has found that it does have juris-
diction on the basis of Article 14 (1) of the Montreal Convention of September 23, 1971 to
hear the disputes between Libya and the United Kingdom and the United States as to the
interpretation or application of the provisions of that Convention notwithstanding the action
of the Security Council. Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K. &
U.S), 1998 I.C.J. 53, (Feb. 27) (Preliminary Objections).
74. In the context of the outbreak of violence in the Serbian province of Kosovo during
the spring and summer of 1998, the claim has been made that it would be "absurdly legalistic
to act on the Security Council's say-so" given the possible (Russian) veto of Security Coun-
cil authorization for intervention. Intervene and Be Damned?, ECONOMIST, July 4-10, 1998,
at 14. Contemplating this possibility, President Clinton was reported to have made the case
for air strikes against Serbian targets without authorization from the Security Council. See
Carla Anne Robbins, NATO Surveys Members on Kosovo Air Strikes: Objective Is to End
Attacks by Serbs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1998, at A10. Igor S. Ivanov, the Russian Foreign
Minister, advised the 53d session of the General Assembly against any acceptance of
"attempts to undercut the Charter-stipulated powers of the Security Council to use coercive
Reappraising Policy Objections
The partisan or political invocation of the right of humanitarian in-
tervention, on the other hand, while not ideal, can be attributed to the
domestic forces of realpolitik but still governed by law and accommo-
dated by the fact that humanitarian intervention has been regarded as a
permissive rather than mandatory norm in legal doctrine and practice.
Some will, however, regard this course with a great sense of unease and
foreboding because this path could compromise the normative integrity
of international law as well as its claim to offer procedural coherence.
Yet, the decentralized structure of this system, together with the short-
comings of the system when centralized, both act as an effective
counter-point to these concerns and allow us to appreciate why states
may, on occasion, feel the need to factor the right of humanitarian inter-
vention into the normative equation on the use of force." In addition, it
is worth reminding ourselves that there is no immediate or compelling
guarantee that armed force processed or authorized by an international
institution for humanitarian purposes will ipsofacto be less open to abu-
sive behavior.76
So, if states do express the intention to permit such actions in prin-
ciple, perhaps one way of reducing the resultant uncertainty would be to
identify a de minimis threshold--drawn from recent and past experi-
ences of state practice-for such operations," so as to set a basic trigger
measures.' Barbara Crossette, West and Russia in Accord on Kosovo Actions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1998, at A8. "We must not allow," he argued "[the] creation of a precedent involv-
ing the use of military power in a crisis without the support of the Security Council." Id. See
also the position of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during the Kurdish
crisis in Iraq in April 1991 that "[iut should not be beyond the wit of man to get planes [into
northern Iraq] with tents, food and warm blankets" and that it was "not a question of stand-
ing on legal niceties.' George G. Church, The Course of Conscience, TIME, Apr. 15, 1991, at
22.
75. See W. Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to
Protect the lbos, in HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1973); Lillich, supra note 1, at 326; A.J. THOMAS & ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS,
THE DOMINICAN CRISIS 1965-LEGAL ASPECTS 22 (1966).
76. See, for instance, the discussion by Lori Fisler Damrosch, Commentary on Collec-
tive Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 198 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
Abuse can take one of two forms: either of the mandate at hand or of the breach of the rules
of warfare in the execution of that mandate. The American-led intervention, authorized by the
United Nations, in Somalia in 1992 is the most potent example of the latter case. See Richard
Dowden, U.S. Massacred 1,000 Somalis, Revealed: How Trapped Soldiers Fired Indiscrimi-
nately on Crowds and Used Corpses and Shields, OBSERVER (London), Mar. 22, 1998, at 1.
77. As is done, for example, by Murphy who contends that certain conditions may be
identified in state practice which could trigger humanitarian intervention-such as when human
rights violations occur "on a large scale, when they are persistent, and when, in some fashion,
they shock the conscience of humanity." MURPHY, supra note 1, at 17. Evidence is further ad-
duced to substantiate this thesis that "there is an implied hierarchy of human rights and that
gross violations by states of certain internationally recognized human rights are accorded
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device in place for future reference and use. Of course, this threshold
would be of limited value in rectifying discrepancies in comparable
cases, but it is one important contribution--coupled with the rigorous
application of the humanitarian mandate for the action-that could be
made in regulating the right of humanitarian intervention in practice.
For as long as humanitarian intervention is conceptualized as a right, as
opposed to an obligation, of states, the problem of discretionary inter-
vention will remain an intractable one, but this problem should then be
set against the difficulties that could result from confining such matters
to the province of the Security Council at this point in time.7
These difficulties extend to important practical limitations on how
the Security Council may respond in a given crisis or conflict situation.
Even accepting, arguendo, the principle that Security Council authori-
zation is the sole legal basis for some form of humanitarian action, that
this in itself would produce the desired results of affording humanitarian
protection to imperiled populations is doubtful. Although the Security
Council determined on April 5, 1991 that "the repression of the Iraqi
civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in
Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees to-
wards and across international frontiers and to cross border incursions"
constituted a threat to regional peace and security, the Security Council
stopped short of sanctioning the use of force.79 Conventional speculation
at that point in time suggested that if any such resolution had been put to
the vote in the Security Council, certain states would have made the
resolution the victim of the veto. 0 The same states, however, made it
understood that they would not protest individual (or collective) state
action to achieve the same result: their chief concern was not to estab-
lish an institutional precedent that could be used against them within
that political setting at some future point in time.
Within the specified Charter framework on the use of force
(contained in Chapter VII), concerned states were thus faced with either
non-action or an exceptional invocation of the right of humanitarian in-
greater weight by the international community' Id. at 9; see also Damrosch, supra note 76, at
215 (arguing that "if the issue [of humanitarian intervention] were confined to the legitimacy of
using force against outrages of genocidal proportions ... the legal arguments [of reconciling
such actions with the Charter would be] close"); infra notes 94, 95 and accompanying text.
78. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 382-87.
79. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991) (ten votes in
favor, three votes against (Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe), with China and India abstaining).
80. David J. Scheffer, Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq and the New World
Order, in RIGHT VERSUS MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 109, 145-46
(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991). Cf. Helmut Freudenschul3, Article 39 of the U.N. Charter Re-
visited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the U.N. Security Council, 46 AuS. J.
PUB. INT'LL. 1, 10-11 (1993).
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tervention.8 ' For this precise reason, humanitarian intervention remains a
separate doctrinal categorization in international law: it encapsulates the
notion from the classical period of international law, pre-dating the in-
ternational law of human rights, of the individual or collective use of
force on humanitarian grounds without the need to secure institutional
authorization for "humanitarian intervention." 2 As such, humanitarian
intervention provides an essential working principle or conceptual
framework for examining the extent to which state practice supports this
form of the use of force in modem international law.
Although there was similar international approbation for forcible
action in the case of Liberia in August 1990, the hands of the Security
Council were tied-and even overloaded-by the consequences of the
Iraqi invasion of neighboring Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The Council
only managed to support the urgent August 1990 intervention by West
African forces in Liberia some two years later, in November 1992.3
Controversial though they may seem, realistic considerations force us to
81. See FERNANDO R.TEsON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 185 (2d ed. 1997). In striking contrast to the legal justifications offered by states for
so-called "humanitarian interventions" during the period of the Cold War, on which see supra
note 27, consider the justification for Operation Provide Comfort given by the British Foreign
Secretary, Douglas Hurd: "[international law recognizes extreme humanitarian need." Parlia-
mentary Papers 1992-93, 1992 BRTrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 824. This was elaborated upon by Tony
Aust, legal counsel in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office:
[Security Council] Resolution 688, which applies not only to northern Iraq but to
the whole of Iraq, was not made under Chapter VII. Resolution 688 recognized
that there was a severe human rights and humanitarian situation in Iraq and, in
particular, northern Iraq; but the intervention in northern Iraq "Provide Comfort"
was in fact, not specifically mandated by the United Nations, but the states taking
action in northern Iraq did so in exercise of the customary international law prin-
ciple of humanitarian intervention.
Id. Consider also Reisman's view: "in these situations, it is not the human rights deprivations
suffered by the victims that are perceived as the compulsion or justification for action. The
justification for action is found in the threats the situations pose to the rest of us." Reisman,
supra note 1, at 433.
82. See supra notes 1, 26 and accompanying text. At the height of the Cold War, the right
of humanitarian intervention was mooted as a possible alternative to Security Council action or
authorization because of "the failure of the United Nations to take effective steps to curb the
genocidal conduct and alleviate [ .... ] mass suffering." Richard B. Lillich, The International
Protection of Rights by General International Law, 1972 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMrTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 38, 54. Even
though the Security Council thrives on its current lease of life, and even though it is operating in
a political environment of greater international co-operation, the Security Council may prove
unable (as in Liberia (1990)) or unwilling (as in northern Iraq (1991) and southern Iraq (1992))
to authorize the use of force for humanitarian purposes, so the issue still remains a relevant one.
83. See S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 3138th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doe. S/RESfl88 (1992)
("welcoming the continued commitment of the Economic Community of the West African
States (ECOWAS) to and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict"); see
also Nolte, supra note 63, at 608 (discussing the significance of the resolution and its timing).
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recognize that even when the international political climate is marked
by co-operation and not division, the omnicompetence of the Security
Council in such matters, quite apart from whether this power is desir-
able or not, remains a remote and uncertain prospect. In international
law, then, what residual discretion lies with states when faced with a
humanitarian crisis on the scale of Liberia (1990) or northern (and even
southern) Iraq (1991) to exercise the right to use force for humanitarian
protection in lieu of authorization by the Security Council?
C. Purity of Motive
Reservations and residual fears as to the legal toleration of humani-
tarian intervention also emanate from an abiding skepticism that states
are unlikely, if ever, to engage their forces in authentic altruistic inter-
ventions and that supposing otherwise is naive, if not foolish. As
corporate Hobbesian offspring, states are only prepared to act in their
own self-interest, making the so-called right of humanitarian interven-
tion appear as nothing more than a lingering, even self-contradictory,
legal convenience. Michael Walzer, the moral philosopher, considers
that the lives of foreigners "don't weigh heavily in the scales of domes-
tic decision-making" and resigns himself to the apparent inevitability of
"mixed motives." Also, the historical record is one in which "the hu-
manitarian motive [in such cases] is at least balanced, if not outweighed,
by a desire to protect alien property or to re-enforce socio-political and
economic instruments of the status quo.""5 In seeking to incorporate the
right of humanitarian intervention into its ranks, international law thus
84. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT wrrH HIs-
TORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 102 (2d ed. 1992).
85. Franck & Rodley, supra note 27, at 279. The French intervention in Rwanda in June
1994 occurred amidst claims that the intervention was designed to assist the ailing Hutu gov-
ernment. These claims were fervently denied by the French Defense Minister Frangois lotard
who said that the object of the operation was to "enforce a U.N. Resolution to stop atrocities."
French Prime Minister Balladur gave similar assurances that the French forces would not "get
caught up in internal struggles." Andrew Gumbel et al., U.N. Backs French Intervention in
Rwanda in Spite of Doubts over "Hwnanitarian" Motives, GUARDIAN (London), June 23, 1994,
at 28. Also, the French troops did not obstruct the advances made on Kigali, the Rwandan capi-
tal, and the second largest city of Butare by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front, which
they captured on July 4, 1994. See Sam Kiley & Charles Bremner, Rwandan Rebels Seize
Capital and Second City, TIMES (London), July 5, 1994, at 14. The French government did,
however, later issue instructions to French forces to halt any further advances where these
placed the lives of Hutu refugees at risk. See Barry James, Rebels Take Kigali, French Army
Guards Fleeing Rwandans, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (London), July 5, 1994, at 1. For a suggestion
that humanitarian protection was behind France's creation of "safety zone" in southwestern
Rwanda on July 2, 1994, see Barry R. Posen, Military Responses to Refugee Disasters, 21
INT'L SEC. 72, 97 (1996). For the domestic political considerations that accompanied the




adopts not only a dangerous stance but a hypocritical one: states never
act for purely humanitarian reasons such that the right of humanitarian
intervention can never serve as anything more than a smokescreen justi-
fication which the law should neither embrace nor be seen to embrace.
8 6
Though closely related to the first criticism made of humanitarian
intervention-the prospect of abuse-the need for the purity of the mo-
tives behind such operations may be differentiated on the ground that it
arguably applies even in cases of prima facie lawful intervention. That
is to say that for any lawful humanitarian intervention to occur, not only
must the use of armed force be kept in check and defined by humani-
tarian need, but the motives of participating governments should also be
unassailable. Renewed doubt, for instance, has been cast on the 1860-61
French "humanitarian intervention" in Syria because whether "humani-
tarian considerations" were "decisive" is questionable. French motives
were "probably ambiguous" enough to preclude the episode from being
categorized as a reliable precedent of humanitarian intervention."
There is, however, something decidedly spurious about making legal
determinations on the basis of ulterior motives or hidden agendas. u For
one thing, the voices of political sophisticates during the 1990-91 Gulf
Conflict capitalized on this theme when they alleged that the response of
the Western world to the Iraqi occupation of neighboring Kuwait was
governed by the law of self-interest and not the law of self-defense be-
cause "if Kuwait had been famous for its carrots, the United States
would not have lifted its proverbial finger."89 Yet seldom, if at all, was
this concern translated into legal argument; nor was this concern used to
upset the prevailing opinion of the time that the actions of the coalition
86. Istvan Pogany criticizes the French intervention in Syria in the nineteenth century on
the basis inter alia that "it would be naive to view the object of French intervention as wholly
humanitarian." Istvan Pogany, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French
Intervention in Syria Re-examined, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 182, 188 (1986). In similar vein,
Michael Bazyler argues that "Vietnam's motives for invading Kampuchea [in December
1978] .... cast serious doubt on whether the Vietnamese invasion can be justified by the hu-
manitarian intervention doctrine" Bazyler, supra note 32, at 608. Bazyler does, however,
concede that "purity of motive" is unrealistic and concludes that because of this "one should not
condemn an intervention as nonhumanitarian merely because the intervening power also has
political, economic, or social motives for intervening." Id. at 602. What is advanced in this essay
is the more pragmatic test of what the direct consequences (as a matter of fact) of an alleged
humanitarian intervention are, so as to determine where it stands as a matter of law.
87. See Pogany, supra note 86, at 187, 190; cf. Kloepfer, supra note 56, at 258-59.
88. Leo Kuper questions whether "impurity of motive" is a valid objection to humanitarian
intervention given the intrinsic nature of state behavior and the alternative strategy "to impose
conditions to reduce, in some measure, the outright abuse of the doctrine." Leo Kuper, Theoreti-
cal Issues Relating to Genocide: Uses and Abuses, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 31, 42 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994).
89. The intriguing remark is attributable to the British Labor parliamentarian Tam Da-
lyell MP.
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governments and their forces were founded on a firm legal footing. Pro-
fessor Tes6n has made the important observation that we should not
confuse "psychological motivation" with "legal justification"9°-an ap-
proach that is sure to lose us in a quagmire of speculation, recurring
claim and counter-claim.9
Besides, what is the exact logic behind mapping the motives behind
an action? If "motive" is considered to be the sine qua non for permissi-
ble interventions, why is the legal authority for this proposition so
difficult to trace? Even if we were to accept these terms, would insis-
tence on the "purity" of motive be logical? If not, why does "motive"
then matter? If so, are motive-based arguments workable in practice?
Are the real motives of states that simple to ascertain? Do states act on
90. TES6N, supra note 81, at 254. To similar effect, see the argument advanced by Lil-
lich that the "economic interests of the great powers .... does not necessarily impeach the
viability of the rules that were established" to protect their nationals on alien territories.
Lillich, supra note 1, at 328. Applying this distinction in practice, Rein Miillerson has, for
example, made the persuasive argument that
accepting that the concern for Kuwaiti oil was the main (or even overwhelming)
factor triggering Operation Desert Storm would not in any way delegitimize the
world community's response (led by the United States) to the Iraqi aggression.
Saddam Hussein had also committed an original sin against the very essence of the
interstate system-a direct across-the-border invasion. Even if it were possible to
find out which had more influence in triggering the coalition's response-a blatant
armed attack by Iraq or Western oil interests-it would not delegitimize the re-
sponse.
Rein Millerson, Book Review, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 585 (1998) (reviewing MURPHY,
supra note 1). This approach takes into appropriate and necessary account the behavioral
realities of states as well as the consideration specified by Murphy that, "to assert that states
must be wholly 'disinterested' in participating in humanitarian intervention ignores rudi-
mentary aspects of geopolitical behavior and may discourage any interventions from
occurring at all." MURPHY, supra note 1, at 323.
91. See Philip Alston, The Security Council and Human Rights: Lessons to be Learned
from The Iraq-Kuwait Crisis and Its Aftermath, 1992 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 107, 110-12
(comparing Andre Gunder Frank, Third World War: A Political Economy of the Gulf War and
the New World Order, 13 THIRD WORLD Q. 267 (1992), who mapped out Western economic,
geo-political and hegemonic interests that allegedly underpinned the reason for military
involvement, with Peter M. Labonski and Kunal M. Parker, Human Rights As Rhetoric: The
Persian Gulf War and United States Policy Toward Iraq, 4 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 152, 155-56
(1990), arguing that President Bush "rallied the general public to a war not just for oil or
money, but for humanity"). The emergence of humanitarian values within the international
system, alien to the unadulterated stato-centric model of an "international community," is
one that is sure to attract a growing following: recalling the commitment of 500,000 military
personnel in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United Nations
compared this with the relative inaction of states in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
proclaimed that the latter tragedy "has far more worrisome dimensions, as manifested in
unspeakable crimes against humanity. There are essential values that should indeed be of
strategic importance for the international community." U.N. SCOR, 3227 mtg., at 25, U.N.
Doc. S/PV. 3228 (1993).
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the basis of single or multiple imperatives? 9' Are these imperatives hier-
archical? Do the motives of states engaged in humanitarian
interventions remain constant? What of the factor of competing motives
where there is multilateral action? Is asserting that states never act on
the basis of humanitarian imperatives correct? 93 What legal significance
is to be given to such considerations? Indeed, should legal significance
be given to such considerations?
What matters in such situations is not so much the nature of the
motive--elusive as this may be to detect or determine-but the practi-
cal outcome of the intervention in question: did forcible humanitarian
protection alone take place as a direct consequence of armed inter-
vention?' The use of objective, identifiable, de minimis legal criteria
(proportionality is a classic principle in point) is to be preferred over
92. Operation Alba, for example, the Italian-led intervention in Albania in April 1997, was
attributed to reasons of "geography, history and perhaps even idealism.' See A Naughty New Bit
of Nationalism, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17-25, 1997, at 30. On March 28, 1997, the Security Council
"authorized the member states participating in the multinational protection force to conduct the
operation in a neutral and impartial way" in order to "facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of
humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of interna-
tional organizations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance." S.C. Res.
1101, U.N. SCOR 3758th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 101 (1997). The Resolution, which was
adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, further authorized member states "to
ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the said multinational force."
Id. This consideration coincides with the identity of the intervening state(s) which does not itself
appear to be treated as a significant or material factor. See D.W. Bowett, International Incidents:
New Genre or New Delusion?, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 386, 388 (1987).
93. Some of the sternest critics of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention concede that
"genuine case[s] of humanitarian intervention" do exist. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, see supra note 30,
at 340; Iona Lewis & James Mayall, Somalia, in THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994:
UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YuGOsLAVIA AND SOMALIA 94, 110-11
(James Mayall ed., 1996) (discussing the possible motivations behind America's involvement in
Somalia in 1992); Andrew S. Natsios, Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Eco-
nomics of Chaos, in LEARNING FROM SOMALIA: THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 77, 78 (Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997) (suggesting that the American
intervention in Somalia in 1992 was based "entirely on humanitarian rather than geopolitical
objectives"); JOHN G. SOMMER, HOPE RESTORED? HUMANITARIAN AID IN SOMALIA 1990-
1994, at 29-33 (1994) (highlighting the political significance of providing humanitarian relief,
support, and supplies at that point in time).
The fact that Canada does not possess a colonial past in Africa established the bona fide
credentials of her leadership of the proposed military intervention in Zaire in November 1996.
See Joseph Fitchett, Canada Agrees to Lead Military Force in Zaire, INT'L HERALD TRIB.
(London), Nov. 1, 1996, at 1. But the multinational force organized for this operation was not
actually deployed. See N.D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 128 (2d ed. 1997).
94. W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 284 (1985); see also Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Para-
digm, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 503, 505-06 (1990) (arguing that "rescue missions cannot be
persuasively indicted as violations of international law, as long as they comply with the prin-
ciples of proportionality and necessity.., and are not tainted by ulterior motives").
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determinations based upon evaluations of subjective intent-which
may well prove nigh impossible to pin down. Even where the true
motives behind an international action are discernible, using these
motives to trump the lawfulness of an operation is unreasonable where
the sole consequence of a given operation is the actual protection of
human life, where this reason is given as the legal justification for ac-
tion and is accepted as such by the world community. In analogous
terms, it is not difficult to envisage the general acceptance that would
greet the exercise of the right of (collective) self-defense against an
aggressor even where this was animated by religious or economic con-
siderations-so long as the application of defensive force was
confined to the return of territorial integrity and political independ-
ence to its lawful proprietor.
The foregoing is not to deny the possible relevance which ulterior
motives or clandestine intentions could have. Considerations of this na-
ture do become important where the quintessential humanitarian
dimension of the intervention is superseded by sinister schemes of per-
manent political change or by some form of international control in
which case the ulterior motives of the military operation exposes the
unlawful-or impermissible-use of force. This is because in its doc-
trinal form and traditional application, the right of humanitarian
intervention has only mandated the use of force insofar as it is necessary
and proportionate for the purpose of humanitarian protection-its very
raison d'gtre." Where ulterior motives do manifest themselves as a re-
sult of the use of force-such as in the provision of armed support for
secessionist movements or the unseating of a government from its
throne of power-this manifestation would be a clear breach and abuse
of the legal mandate for the right of humanitarian intervention and, in
all likelihood, would be contested on these grounds by the international
community at large.
By way of illustration, it is worth recalling the swiftness and effi-
cacy with which Operation Provide Comfort was executed in northern
Iraq in 1991-an intervention which was commissioned to protect life
95. It is on this basis that Judge Koroma has criticized Rougier's definition of humanitarian
intervention as "the right of one State to exercise international control by military means over
the acts of another State with regard to its internal sovereignty when such acts had been exer-
cised in a manner contrary to the laws of humanity." Abdul G. Koroma, Humanitarian
Intervention and Contemporary International Law, 5 REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
Er DE DROlT EUROPtEN 409, 413 (1995). Concern, however, has been expressed as to whether
the extended no-fly zone in southern Iraq remains necessary and the extent to which it has im-
plications beyond its original humanitarian objectives. See supra note 55 and accompanying
text; Roula Khalaf, Iraq to Defy No-Fly Zone, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 22, 1997, at 7; White




by the states involved and did, in real terms, do so-at a time when the
nature and authenticity of the expressed humanitarian ambitions of the
project were made the subject of intense critical (and politicized) inves-
tigation. The precedent suggests that the law is more usefully engaged
where it designates the conditions for the permissible use of force in
cases of humanitarian crises as long as the international community is
willing to endorse forcible humanitarian protection in principle.9, This
has occurred where a state wishes to protect its own nationals whose
lives are placed at risk on foreign soil: the controlled or proportionate
use of force-"the epitome of a 'surgical' military sortie" 97-has war-
ranted general legal acknowledgement by states on condition that this
humanitarian intervention does not encompass the realization of im-
proper or insupportable motives, that is motives which do not coincide
with the imperative legal basis which has driven states to accept the
principle of limited force to protect their own nationals.
So, the purity of motive factor needs to be properly and appropri-
ately quantified when we engage in the rigors and the dynamics of legal
analysis. In general terms, an inquiry by lawyers into the motives behind
a particular action or use of force will, in all likelihood, lead us down a
blind and unproductive alley, for it is "na've to consider that states can
be put on the psychiatrist's couch where their hidden motivations will be
revealed.""8 Of greater import are the principal consequences of any
given military operation: even where a state's reasons for action are
open to question or placed in grave doubt, if the international commu-
nity is willing to summon and approve the transnational use of force to
achieve a designated humanitarian objective, the use of force should be
permitted insofar as--and only insofar as-the use of force is targeted
towards attaining the permitted humanitarian reason for action. Once
this lawful goal has been achieved, the legal mandate for the use of
force (or the presence of foreign forces) expires and any continued force
or presence will solicit international public censure and become vulner-
able to charges of unlawful action.
96. Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting
the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law-Part , 20 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 305, 330-34 (1992); James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian
Intervention In A Community of Power, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9,29-32 (1991).
97. YORAM DINs'rEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 229 (2d ed. 1994). For the
legal distinction that has been made between the protection of a state's own nationals as
opposed to humanitarian intervention, which is the use of force to protect the threatened
nationals of the target state, see supra note 1.
98. Tsagourias, supra note 16, at 370.
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V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION VERSUS SOVEREIGNTY
Policy objections do not alone fuel the considerable juristic opposi-
tion toward the formal endorsement or acceptance of the right of
humanitarian intervention in international law. Humanitarian interven-
tion is also considered to be irreconcilable with the seminal doctrine of
sovereignty and, as such, embodies the polar opposite of received legal
wisdom. Humanitarian intervention, it is argued, does not only facilitate
menacing state behavior, but also constitutes a radical departure from
established legal ideas and traditions: any manifestation of humanitarian
intervention in practice would be no more and no less than a full frontal
assault on the sovereignty of the target state and this proposition is un-
tenable in a system that worships the sovereignty of each of its
constituent states.
Yet history testifies that actual restrictions were placed on a sover-
eign's treatment of its own citizens even before the classical period of
international law-and these were dutifully recognized and recorded in
the work of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 99 and, over a century later, by the
Swiss writer Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767). 'oo That sovereignty has
traditionally admitted such formal limitations is partially explained by
the fact that the world is composed of a proliferation of states: the world
has become one of competing and co-existing sovereigns and not of a
single state or a monopolistic sovereign. In the figurative sense, then, no
state can be said to be an island: what a state does and what it chooses to
do are observed by other states in the global neighborhood.'0 ' Whatever
99. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Er PACIS bk. II, ch. XXV, § 8 (1625).
100. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROr DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE
210 (J.B.C. Mohr Tubinger ed., 1959) (1758). Humanitarian intervention is actually "pre-
Grotian." See Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 110 (1991). This proposition continued to find support in the first decade of this
century:
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy,
a state can treat its nationals according to discretion. But there is a substantial
body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that there are limits to that
discretion and that when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties against and perse-
cution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental rights and to
shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is le-
gally permissible.
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 (1905); cf LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LAW OF PEACE 442-44 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992) (concluding that "intervention in the interest of humanity might be permissible")
(emphasis added).
101. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., Supp. 1, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (1991); Report of the Secretary-General on An
Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 31 I.L.M. 953, 959;
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"outrage[s] upon humanity"' 02-or, in the words of John Stuart Mill,
"severities repugnant to humanity"'3 -occur in this neighborhood pre-
suppose a common set of values that are (potentially at least) worth
defending or protection. This is to be done in the first instance by con-
verting international public opinion into diplomatic censure which
could, in turn, ripen into "corrective action" because:
The case for not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity and political independence of states.... would only be
weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty,
even in this day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or
of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced
exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling civil
strife or insurrection.'O
Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter gives this state of affairs
legal recognition. Well-known for its articulation of the principle of
non-intervention qua the United Nations "in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," this provision
confirms that the principle of non-intervention within the United Na-
tions system is not absolute and, in terms of its wider context and
history, no longer impenetrable. Article 2 (7) stipulates that the principle
of non-intervention shall not "prejudice" any enforcement measures
taken in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. Here we have a
clear prioritization of community will (as expressed in the determina-
tions of the Security Council) over and above individual claims of
"sovereignty" but only where the Security Council finds a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."' '° States have therefore
identified two values in one treaty provision-the principle of non-
intervention and the notion of international peace and security-but they
have, at one and the same time, also expressed preference for the latter
value in casus extremis.
Bhikhu Parekh, Towards the Just World Order: The Aims and Limits of Humanitarian Interven-
tion, TIMEs LrrERARY SUPPLEMENr, Sept. 26, 1997, at 24.
102. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 1946 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1,46.
103. John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in ESSAYS ON POLIcS AND
CULTURE 368-80 (Gertrude Himmelfard ed., 1973) (1859).
104. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, supra note 101, at
5.
105. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter stipulates this as a condition precedent for
lawful measures (not involving the use of force) to be taken under Article 41 or "such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity" under Article 42. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
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The principle of non-intervention, hailed as the constitutional safe-
keeper of the sovereignty of all states, therefore, admits to legal limita-
tion qua the United Nations." This is the unambiguous, literal meaning
of Article 2 (7). But our legal world is not populated with conventional
laws alone. The International Court of Justice made the adroit and wel-
come observation in the Nicaragua Case (1986), often overlooked, that
international law also comprises a series of customary prescriptions and
norms: "it was never intended that the Charter should embody written
confirmation of every essential principle of international law in force."',
One of these customary principles is that of non-intervention. Indeed,
the very principle of non-intervention as it governs relations between
states qua each other commands its authority from the firmament of
customary international law; the principle is not "as such, spelt out in
the United Nations Charter."'1' The customary nature and legal force of
this cardinal principle (alongside that on the prohibition on the use of
force) means that our task as lawyers is to investigate whether interna-
tional law places similar incursions or limitations on this principle in
custom-that is state practice expressed as legal conviction. Our under-
standing of the state of custom at a particular point in time depends on
our commitment to analysis, incident by incident, of what states have
been or are in fact doing in order to determine the material field of ap-
plication of the customary law principle of non-intervention: if the
principle of non-intervention exists in customary international law, then
it must be investigated whether this formal source of law admits any
exceptions to or deviations from the principle of non-intervention.
The conflict between humanitarian intervention and sovereignty
also manifests itself in the realm of jus cogens where states have rallied
behind certain principles which are or have been depicted as
"peremptory norms of general international law."' 9 The strength and
106. But see U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (affirming the principle of the sovereign equal-
ity of all states, be they large or small, strong or weak, wealthy or not, and it is from this that the
principle of non-intervention derives).
107. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 1202, at 106. See also CASSESE, supra note 8, at 181-
85; WILFRED C. JENKS, LAW IN THE WORLD COMMuNrrY 8-9 (1967) (viewing spontaneous and
institutional custom as "important illustrations of the continued vitality of custom in contempo-
rary international law").
108. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 202, at 106.
109. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 18, art. 53. See generally
JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1974);
CHRISTOS L. ROzAKis, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES (1976). Through
their rules of recognition, other peremptory norms may emerge in international law to add to the
extant family of superior values which the community of nations holds sacrosanct. Article 64 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes provision for "new" peremptory norms of
general international law and states that "any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm
becomes void and terminates."
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duration of support for the principle of non-intervention in state practice
must surely qualify the principle for this status," ° reinforced as it is by
the proscription on the use of force (itself a main exemplar of jus co-
gens) contained in the United Nations Charter."' The prohibition of
genocide has also attained the force of jus cogens,"2 such that states
have sanctified an increasing range of premium norms which in the
grand scheme of affairs are meant to co-exist with and even reinforce
each other.
However, in accepting this growing series of ineluctable norms as
"fundamental and superior values within the [international] system, '" 3 it
is at least arguable that by their behavior in recent practice, states have
effectively pointed to the possibility that they have created a conflict of
interests-that is, the individual versus the common interest. On the one
hand, the principles of non-intervention and the non-use of force serve
to protect the sovereignty of states; on the other hand, the right of hu-
manitarian intervention could be seen as one conceivable means of
providing meaningful and effective protection for potential victims of
genocidal or para-genocidal killing."' In the absence of authorization for
action from the Security Council, humanitarian intervention could be
seen as an alternative means of realizing the obligation to prevent geno-
cide. However, such a far-reaching and radical construction of the terms
of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Genocide,"' which would envisage scope for some form of
110. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 147.
111. Both parties involved in the Nicaragua Case accepted this principle in their written
submissions. This principle is of a general rather than an absolute nature since the United Na-
tions Charter also accommodates the right to use force in self-defense. This means that the
proposition that the principle prohibiting the use of force has attained the status of jus cogens
(i.e. from which no derogation is permitted) is "not without its difficulties." Rosalyn Higgins,
Fundamentals of International Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 16 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana ed., 1995).
112. Malcolm N. Shaw, Genocide and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
TIME OF PERPLEXITY 797 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989).
113. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (4th ed. 1997).
114. Natalino Ronzitti has expressed the alternative view that
while it is quite sure that the obligation to refrain from the use of force is embod-
ied in a peremptory norm of international law, it is not at all sure that the duty to
promote human rights is set forth in the jus cogens rule. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to agree that the value protected by the duty to safeguard human rights should
prevail over the value protected by the rule which forbids the use of force.
NATALINO RONZITrI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF
HUMANITY 15 (1985).
115. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 (1951). The precise wording of the obligation of this Convention is instructive: according to
Article 1, the High Contracting Parties "confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
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armed remedial intervention to nip genocidal killing in the bud, was
contemplated in the Sixth Committee during the ninth session of the
General Assembly, but was opposed by Israel, Nationalist China, and
Panama. "6 The context of the realpolitik of the Cold War meant that
states, eager to keep the legal opportunities for resort to force to their
bare minimum in order to contain the risk of conflict, prioritized their
own individual concerns above and beyond any competing (i.e. commu-
nity) concerns and proved reluctant to disturb the Charter law on the use
of force by appealing to or placating any so-called right of humanitarian
intervention.
The watershed developments that have taken place after the Cold
War have, at the very least, re-opened these macro-legal questions, to
the point where our immediate past is littered with various and varied
examples of humanitarian action, ranging from the provision of hu-
manitarian assistance to full-scale intervention. These responses to
humanitarian tragedies (of one form or another) could be interpreted as
a series of freak impulses or reflexes with limited or no legal signifi-
cance: these responses have occurred as a matter of fact, but it is
questionable whether these responses can be said to have given rise to a
new phenomenon as a matter of law. An alternative view would be to
regard the world (meaning the states that compose it) as having expe-
rienced some sort of humanitarian awakening in the normative sense,
so that there are now cases where the community concern (such as the
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and
to punish" Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
On March 20, 1993, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings
against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for violating the Genocide Convention, but also
submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. The Court responded on April 8, 1993 with an Order
which specified certain provisional measures for the protection of rights under the Genocide
Convention. These measures, however, were found to be insufficient by the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, which submitted a second (exceptional) request for provisional
measures on July 27, 1993, but the Court responded on September 13, 1993 by reaffirming
its earlier Order. The Court subsequently found, on July 11, 1996, that it had jurisdiction to
hear the case-but that this jurisdiction rested on Article IX of the Genocide Convention. In
so ruling, the Court dismissed the claim made by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that
the case was inadmissible. The case is now on its merits before the Court, and in its counter-
memorial of July 22, 1997, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has launched a counter-
claim in which it has requested the Court to declare that the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina "is responsible for the acts of genocide committed against the Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina" and that it has "the obligation to punish the persons held responsible" for these
acts. Yugoslavia has also asked the Court to rule that Bosnia and Herzegovina is "bound to
take necessary measures so that the said acts would not be repeated" and "to eliminate all
consequences of the violations." Press Communiqud of the International Court of Justice,
No. 97/18 (Dec. 17, 1997).
116. See Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND Civil WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 217, 227 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
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prevention of genocide) has expressed itself over and above individual
claims of sovereignty and the principles prohibiting intervention and the
use of force.
The growing bank of state practice which has accumulated in recent
times must therefore force the question as to whether, in their increasing
number, these responses are indeed the result of specific normative de-
cisions made by states when faced with the conflicting priorities of jus
cogens. Germany, for example, warned that the treatment of the Kurdish
population in northern Iraq in 1991 "harbor[ed] the danger of genocide"
as a result of "[t]he persecution of this ethnic group" and argued that
"the armed repression against it must be stopped." At a time when
there was no shortage of allegations of genocidal conduct during the
ethnic conflict that ravaged the former Yugoslavia, Turkey (acting on
behalf of the Organization of Islamic Conference) tabled a resolution in
August 1992 which called for military intervention for the protection of
Muslim populations in the Balkans."' For her part, Russia has made her
position with regard to the treatment of ethnic Russians in neighboring
or proximate states crystal-clear, to the effect that "[i]n certain cases, the
use of direct military force might be necessary to protect our compatri-
ots abroad."" 9 Through humanitarian intervention, as defined at the
outset of this article, 20 we are therefore able to address the specific
117. U.N. SCOR, 2982 mtg. at 73, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2982(1991).
118. 38 KEEsING's RECORD WORLD EVENTS 39036 (1992); see also SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGrON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 286
(1996).
119. Andrew Higgins, Kremlin Backs War to Protect Ethnic Russians, INDEPENDENT
(London), Apr. 19, 1995, at 7. President Yeltsin threatened the use of force for the first time in
Russian foreign policy in the Balkans when he said, in August 1995: "If peace efforts fail, as
well as attempts to restrain the Serbs, then regrettably force will have to be used by the interna-
tional community." Helen Womack, Yeltsin Hopes Milosevic and Tudiman Will Talk,
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 8, 1995, at 7; see also Leonard Doyle, Russian President Invites
Tudjman and Milosevic to Negotiations As Sidelined E.U. Mediator Hits Back, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 8, 1995, at 7.
120. See supra notes 1, 26 and accompanying text. Adam Roberts has made the cogent
argument that "action by one state or a group of states can be a valuable stopgap while the
[United Nations] slowly cobbles together an international peacekeeping or other force." From
San Francisco to Sarajevo; The U.N. and the Use of Force, 37 SURVIVAL 7, 31 (1995). This
is a measure that would doubtless require the requisite normative foothold if it were to be
regarded as permissible from the perspective of international law. Aside from this considera-
tion, he also points out that for the United Nations, "there may be risks in too-direct
involvement in the management of military forces when terrible mistakes occur, as they in-
evitably do in military operations, [because] they could reflect badly on the organization and
could threaten its universal character." Id. The same may be said where the conditions for
armed intervention, as perceived from a political vantage-point, countenance against formal
United Nations approval, as in the Nigerian-engineered use of force to restored an elected
government to power in Sierra Leone in 1997 (on which, see supra note 92), even though the
United Nations may welcome such endeavors and their proposed outcome.
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question of whether states are able at this point in time to resort to force
in exceptional humanitarian circumstances where authorization for the
use of force is not forthcoming from the United Nations or any other
treaty-based authority or procedure for that matter.
The potential clash which may exist among the values protected by
jus cogens raises fundamental questions of the priorities which states
have created in the international legal order. In the event of a clash be-
tween such values and the norms that have been designed to protect
them, what principles are to determine which of these essential values
and norms prevail? 21 Is preference to be given to the oldest peremptory
norms, those rooted in historic and ancient practice? Or do subsequent
values and norms carry a power of implied repeal? Are we to assume an
anthropocentric or a statist bias? In reaching a decision on this matter, it
is to be preferred if we stand back and take stock of international law's
epic (r)evolution in preferences and its increasing protection afforded to
human beings, either individually or in their multifarious associations-
for it is human beings that are the "ultimate members" of the world
community and its legal order.'22 However, for any solid claim of this
nature to be made in international law, evidence of legal authority is re-
quired, and this will be discerned, in the main, from the normative
convictions which states themselves hold when confronted with con-
flicting values and jus cogens norms. This process exemplifies on a
grand scale the intense friction between the global system's apologies
and its utopias, the outcome of which will be decided by the changing
meaning and understanding of sovereignty within the international law
system."'
121. According to Professor Fernando R. Tes6n, "[t]here is a growing trend in state prac-
tice and the literature in support of the proposition that the prohibition against massive human
rights deprivations is indeed a rule ofjus cogens." TESON, supra note 81, at 168-69. This propo-
sition of law draws us closer to the notion of conflicting peremptory norms and forces us to
address the issue of "why the preservation of peace (the value protected by the rule of non-use
of force) prevails against, say, the prevention of serious and widespread human rights depriva-
tions (the value protected by the exception of humanitarian intervention)." Id. Tes6n also
proposes that "[t]he only way to reach a conclusion is to focus the inquiry on the most appropri-
ate moral-political theory of international law" and goes on to claim that the theory "must
account for both state sovereignty and human rights." Id.
122. JOHN WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1914).
123. In response to repeated criticisms that the United Nations military action in Haiti in
1994 constituted a violation of that country's sovereignty, Professor W. Michael Reisman has
asked an array of thought-provoking questions:
Whose sovereignty? In modern international law, what counts is the sovereignty of
the people and not a metaphysical abstraction called the state. If the de jure gov-
ernment, which was elected by the people, wants military assistance, how is its
sovereignty violated? And if the purpose of the coercion is to reinstate a de jure
government elected in a free and fair election after it was ousted by a renegade
military, whose sovereignty is being violated? The military's?
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VI. FINALE
With its concentration on policy objections to humanitarian inter-
vention, legal scholarship stands in possible danger of abandoning its
preferred role-akin to that followed by the International Court of Jus-
tice in 1986-at a time when state practice appears to have yielded more
readily to the notion of forcible humanitarian protection." 4 The un-
precedented trail of recent international interventions may well mean-
as was said of the legal prohibition on armed reprisals in 1972-that the
scope of the principle of non-intervention is, "because of its divorce
from actual practice, rapidly degenerating to a stage where its normative
character is in question.""' An alternative interpretation would be to re-
gard the justifications offered for the use of force on such occasions as
mere "statements of international policy, and not [as] an assertion of
rules of existing international law."'26 Quantifying the legal significance
W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of International Action, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 82,
83 (1995); Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 866 (1990). Professor Richard Falk, critical of the precedent set by the American
intervention in Haiti in 1994, considered whether the alternative (of non-action) would have
been acceptable. Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent
for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 341, 357 (1995).
124. See Koroma, supra note 95; Rosalyn Higgins, The End of Sovereignty?, 88 PROC.
AM. Soc'Y. INT'L. L. 73, 74 (1994); Richard Falk, The Complexities of Humanitarian Inter-
vention: A New World Order Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491 (1996); W. Michael Reisman,
Humanitarian Intervention and Fledging Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794 (1995);
Christopher Greenwood, Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, THE WORLD TODAY,
Feb. 1993, at 34; Marc Weller, The Kuwait Crisis: A Survey of Some Legal Issues, 3 AFR. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 34-35 (1991).
125. Bowett, supra note 12, at 2.
126. This is how the International Court of Justice described the occasional claims made
by United States officials, that "their grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign state [are]
for reasons connected with, for example, the domestic policies of that country, its ideology, the
level of its armaments, or the directions of its foreign policy." Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J.
207, at 109. There is, of course, the explanation that these actions were considered to be out-
side the realm of the law. The following letter by Professor Arthur Leff of Yale Law School,
which appeared in the New York Times on 4 October 1968, is illustrative of this kind of reason-
ing:
I don't know much about the relevant law. My colleagues here, who do, say that
it's no insurmountable hindrance, but I don't care much about international law,
Biafra or Nigeria. Babies are dying in Biafra.... We still have food for export.
Let's get it to them any way we can .... Forget all the blather about international
law, sovereignty and self-determination, all that abstract garbage: babies are
starving to death...
Tom J. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 149, 151 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); see also
R. George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 FLA. J. INT'L L.
435, 445-51 (1989). However, this approach is unsound given the fact that participating
governments in Liberia (1990) and northern Iraq (1991) appealed to legal norms and legal
standards; they did not see their actions as the result of moral choice and moral choice alone.
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of these actions and attitudes should therefore be embarked upon as a
matter of priority and urgency in order that states are made aware of
what legal developments, if legal developments they so constitute, may
be distilled from the voluminous pulp of modem state practice.127 With
our finger on the pulse of this practice, we will be able to determine
whether the traditional conclusions reached on the legal status of hu-
manitarian intervention continue to command support or whether they
truly have been superseded by changes in the normative convictions of
states, especially after the sweeping transformations that have occurred
in international political actions and attitudes-backed by the use of
force-since the end of the Cold War.
In his seminal essay on the use of force published in 1984, Oscar
Schachter observed that "governments by and large (and most jurists)
would not assert a right to forcible intervention to protect the nationals
of another country from atrocities carried out in that country."'28 As an
exposition of the lex lata of the time, this standpoint was fashionably
correct-and remained so even for a time afterwards where states
proved reluctant to intervene on humanitarian grounds and, where they
did so, chose not to advance the self-same justification as the legal de-
fense for their actions. Should humanitarian intervention still be
regarded as an unlawful head of action for the use of force, the most
recent international interventions that have taken place for humanitarian
reasons but without the relevant institutional authorization at the time of
See, e.g., REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN
CRISIS 75-76, 105-08 (Marc Weller ed., 1994); United Kingdom Materials in International
Law, 1992 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 615, 824; but cf. Franck & Rodley, supra note 27, at 304
("Like civil disobedience, however, this sense of superior 'necessity' (to launch a humani-
tarian intervention] belongs in the realm not of law but of moral choice, which nations, like
individuals, must sometimes make, weighing the costs and benefits of their cause, to the
social fabric and to themselves").
127. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 230-31
(1987) ("If Dr. Akehurst and the many who follow him have their way, their books will never be
out of date because they proclaim and set forth unchanging legal principles to which govern-
ments, regardless of what they actually do, pay lip service.... I would argue that customary law
grows and changes over time as a result of the interactions of states in the international arena
(the facts) and the rules we may infer from those interactions as the theory that best fits what the
states did (even if it was not, or was only partly, what they said they were doing). It is surely
more difficult to do this kind of international law research than to follow Dr. Akehurst and sim-
ply take governmental statements at face value"). Professor D'Amato omits reference in this
passage to the opiniojuris sive necessitatis condition for customary norms to come into being: it
matters a great deal in legal terms whether states cite this head of justification to defend their
actions or risk the imaginative use of less controversial legal grounds for the use of force to
rationalize what they do in international law.




action,19 would be without an appropriate legal basis. However, this in-
terpretation would seem to be at odds with the stance of most
governments who appeared to recognize the need for controlled action
in such cases of humanitarian crisis.'°
Identified as the principal canon in the legal case made against the
right of humanitarian intervention, state practice therefore needs to be
re-evaluated at periodic intervals to ascertain what concrete normative
corrections or changes have been made within the international system.
This critical task cannot be abandoned by habitual or slavish reference
to principle or suspect policies because this will introduce a legal sys-
tem that is but a faint reflection of community attitudes and community
conduct. To similar effect, the legal debate on humanitarian intervention
cannot be won on some moral high ground or on the sole basis of some
fundamental humanitarian presumption or ideal:"' "International law is
about the real policies and commitments of governments, it is not about
the incantations of secular or religious morality."'' And so it was that
the Attorney-General of the United Kingdom, in his representations be-
fore the International Court of Justice on the issue of nuclear weapons in
November 1995, made the claim that "[c]ustom isnot something which
can be conjured from the air, or even, in The Tempest, from the vasty
deep .... It is not something which can be assumed, or deduced from
appeals to general principles of humanity."'33
In the absence of substantiating state practice and opinio juris sive
necessitatis, "[a] right or action [of humanitarian intervention], which
can only be deduced by an elaborate legal sophistry, is nothing more
than an artificial effort at realizing a moral fiction."'' Ultimately, we
shall only be aware of-and be confident of-the outcome of legal
thinking on humanitarian intervention if the right considerations have
129. See supra notes 63, 81 and 83.
130. Tom Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT:
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316, 336 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed.,
1993).
131. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 1995 AUSTL. YB.
INT'L L. 1, 3. As Professor D.W. Bowett noted in his review of the first edition of Tes6n's
HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALrrY (1988): "[Professor
Tes6n] assumes that if the philosophical basis for humanitarian intervention can be established,
its legal validity follows. Unfortunately, state practice does not conform to this kind of logic."
D.W. Bowett, 1988 BRrr. YRBK. INT'L L. 263, 263-64. Prioritizing the moral case for humani-
tarian intervention also leaves the lawyer in difficulty as to what to make of any changing
paradigms and preferences in state practice. See Kritsiotis, supra note 34, at 97.
132. Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 1, 15 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
133. Address of the Attorney-General, Sir Nicholas Lyell, to the International Court of
Justice, November 15, 1995, 1995 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 607, 609.
134. Hassan, supra note 43, at 912.
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been included in the legal analysis of state practice and are given con-
sidered and appropriate weighting.
